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INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 1974, Judge Marvin Frankel told an audience
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York that “our
adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions
1
of justice are meant to serve.” The judge had become frustrated with
2
the “trickery and obfuscation” that he had witnessed during his nine
years on the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. He suggested that the adversary ideal should be modified
3
to make truth “the paramount objective.”
To implement this
suggestion, Frankel proposed tentative amendments to the American
Bar Association’s (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility.
4
Frankel’s amendments would have required a lawyer to (1)
disclose all relevant evidence and prospective witnesses, even when
the lawyer does not intend to offer that evidence and those witnesses;
(2) prevent or report any untrue statement by a client or witness, or
∗

J.D. 2004, Yale Law School. Law clerk to the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan,
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The author owes
a great debt to Professor John H. Langbein of Yale Law School for his support and
encouragement, his careful comments on drafts, and for posing the question that led
to this Article. The author is also extremely indebted to retired New Jersey Supreme
Court Justice Stewart G. Pollock and to a number of other New Jersey attorneys who
generously took the time to share their perspectives on various aspects of ethics and
practice, including Christopher DeFalco, John R. Holsinger, and Albert B. Jeffers.
The author also benefited greatly from conversations with Professor Stephen Gillers
and Kevin H. Michels in which they generously shared their expertise in legal ethics.
Finally, the author wishes to thank Isabel Frank for the kind favor of providing
decisions of New Jersey’s Disciplinary Review Board.
1
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1975)
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2
Id. at 1059.
3
Id. at 1055.
4
See the Appendix for the full text of Frankel’s proposal.
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any omission of material fact, that makes other statements
5
misleading; and (3) at trial, examine witnesses “with a purpose and
design to elicit the whole truth, including particularly supplementary
and qualifying matters that render evidence already given more
6
accurate, intelligible, or fair than it otherwise would be.”
Frankel was not the first person to address the tension between a
7
lawyer’s duty to the client and to the court. Nonetheless, his views
became such an important reference point in modern debate over
the adversary system that in 1996, the article version of his speech was
8
ranked the seventy-sixth most cited law review article of all time.
9
Marvin Frankel, who died on March 3, 2002, came to epitomize
concern with the value of truth in the legal system and was for a time
10
the country’s most prominent critic of the adversary system.
This Article explores the influence of Frankel’s proposals both
on discourse about the legal system as well as on actual legal practice.
In the academy, as Part I of this Article will show, Frankel’s specific
proposals never gained wide acceptance. The most heated debate
11
concerning the duty of candor has involved the question of whether
5

Frankel borrowed this language from the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), which is quoted in the
Appendix of this Article, infra note 272.
6
The Search for Truth, supra note 1, at 1057–58.
7
For an overview of the pre-Frankel debates, see 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, pt. III, at p. 26-6 (3d ed. 2001); A. Kenneth
Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921, 922–23.
8
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV.
751, 767 (1996). The ranking may actually underestimate the number of citations to
Frankel’s ideas because some authors may have cited only Partisan Justice, the 1980
book Frankel published that includes some of the same ideas as The Search for Truth.
See id. at 762. On the other hand, Shapiro’s study is not a perfect measure of
intellectual influence: “[A]n article might summarize a particular idea or issue
effectively so that it becomes a convenient or reflexive cite long after it has ceased to
influence scholars or even to be read.” Id. at 754.
9
Steven Greenhouse, Marvin Frankel, Federal Judge and Pioneer of Sentencing
Guidelines, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at C15.
10
See, e.g., 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 29.22, at p. 29-39 (“The most
unqualified defense of truth as the paramount goal is associated with Judge Marvin
Frankel.”).
11
This Article uses “duty of candor” to refer to the lawyer’s duty of candor to the
court with respect to facts. It would also be possible to study the lawyer’s duty of
candor to the court with respect to the law. See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on
Zealous Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 724–26
(1997); Monroe H. Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L. REV.
833 (1982); Angela Gilmore, Self-Inflicted Wounds: The Duty to Disclose Damaging Legal
Authority, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303 (1995); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Arguing the Law:
The Advocate’s Duty and Opportunity, 16 GA. L. REV. 821 (1982). However, this duty is
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a criminal defense lawyer has a duty to disclose a client’s perjury or
12
other wrongdoing. Frankel’s proposals were far more radical than
the already controversial requirement that a lawyer should inform the
court of his client’s wrongdoing, and his proposals were
13
overshadowed by discussion of that more conservative proposal.
Frankel, however, succeeded in one respect. His specific proposals
14
were meant to be tentative; his larger purpose was to inspire the
legal profession to talk more about the value of truth in an adversary
system and about ways to promote that value. In this he succeeded, at
least in the academy.
He was less successful in producing change in adversarial
practice. As Part II will show, even though Frankel was a member of
the commission that drafted the American Bar Association’s 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and early drafts of the Rules
essentially reflected his position, his views were gradually washed out
of successive drafts until, with minor exceptions, the final version
15
contained no trace of them.
Part III will demonstrate, however, that a disclosure requirement
similar to that proposed by Frankel landed in the Rules of
16
Professional Conduct that New Jersey adopted in 1984. Until now,
New Jersey’s extraordinary rule has not been literally enforced.
Nonetheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court and New Jersey’s
disciplinary bodies appear to have become increasingly interested in
recent years in using the rule to remind lawyers about the importance
of candor. In a case decided in June 2004, the New Jersey Supreme
Court presented its most extensive discussion of the rule to date and,
for the first time ever, cited the very Frankel proposal that appears to
17
be the rule’s ancestor. Thirty years after the publication of Frankel’s
article, this development raises the possibility that attorneys
practicing in New Jersey will be held to a noticeably higher standard
not as closely connected with the truth-seeking function of a trial. See, e.g., John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985)
(noting that what distinguishes the Continental system from the American adversary
system is the lawyer’s role in fact-gathering, not in developing legal theories). For
the sake of putting reasonable boundaries on the scope of this Article, therefore, I
will discuss only the duty of candor to the court with respect to facts.
12
See discussion infra Part I.A.
13
See discussion infra Part I.C.
14
The Search for Truth, supra note 1, at 1031.
15
See infra Part II.
16
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(5) (1984).
17
See In re Seelig, 180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004).
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of candor than attorneys practicing in other jurisdictions.
The final section of this Article draws lessons from the
experience of New Jersey and concludes that Frankel-type reforms
are unlikely to succeed without pervasive changes in the attitudes and
18
habits of the legal profession.
Frankel’s ideas appear also to be at least partly responsible for
another development, but it is one beyond the scope of this Article.
In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were amended
to allow district courts to opt in to a regime requiring pretrial
disclosure of all material that each party plans to use in support of its
19
own claims and defenses. In 2000, the FRCP were amended again to
20
make that regime mandatory. These amendments are traceable to
the ideas expressed in two law review articles written by Wayne Brazil
21
and William Schwarzer respectively, who were both clearly
22
influenced by Frankel.
While these amendments to the FRCP help to reduce the
adversarial character of civil discovery, they do not actually make
lawyers responsible for the truth. The amended rules merely require
that a party disclose what the adversary would ultimately learn
anyway—namely, how the party intends to support its own claims and
defenses. The rule does not impose, as Frankel’s proposals would
23
have, an affirmative obligation to disclose unfavorable material.
18

See infra pp. 51–54.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (1993) (amended 2000).
20
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
21
The Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1993 amendments to the FRCP
specifically state that “[t]he concepts of imposing a duty of disclosure were set forth
in” Wayne Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1348 (1978) and William Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the
Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721–23 (1989). See also
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush To Reform, 27 GA. L.
REV. 1, 15–17 (1992). Brazil eventually became a member of the Advisory
Committee that proposed the 1993 rule. Id. at 17.
22
Brazil’s entire article, supra note 21, is framed as a response to Frankel, and
Schwarzer’s article was also influenced by Frankel’s ideas. See Schwarzer, supra note
21, at 722 & n.58.
23
Arizona and Nevada do impose such an obligation, but a lawyer in these states
only needs to make unfavorable disclosures to opposing counsel; there is no
affirmative duty of candor with respect to the court. Arizona requires attorneys to
disclose “[t]he names and addresses of all persons whom the party believes may have
knowledge or information relevant to the . . . action, and the nature of the
knowledge or information each such individual is believed to possess.” ARIZ. R. CIV.
P. 26.1(a)(4). Arizona also requires attorneys to produce “[a] list of the
documents . . . known by a party to exist whether or not in the party’s possession,
19
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Because these discovery rules do not impose such a duty, and the
24
subject of pretrial disclosure has been extensively treated elsewhere,
this Article does not specifically discuss this topic. Of course,
discovery battles are a major aspect of the adversary character of civil
lawsuits, but the discussion in this Article is limited to ethics
standards.
I. WRESTLING WITH TRUTH IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
A. The Major Arguments
In 1966, Monroe Freedman published a famous article in which
he argued that a criminal defense lawyer has a duty to (1) destroy a
witness “whom you know to be telling the truth”; (2) “put a witness
on the stand when you know he will commit perjury”; and (3) “give
your client legal advice when you have reason to believe that the
25
knowledge you give him will tempt him to commit perjury.”
26
Freedman’s article and the speech on which it was based —which
27
prompted then-Judge Warren Burger to suggest disbarring him —
triggered his career in legal ethics, and he eventually became the
28
country’s most prominent academic champion of adversary values.
Since Freedman’s article, much of the literature on the duty of
candor in the adversary system—indeed, the literature on the
adversary system itself—has focused on the question of whether a

custody or control and which that party believes may be relevant to the subject
matter of the action.” ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(9). Nevada requires attorneys in
pretrial discovery to “[e]xchange written lists of persons . . . believed to have
knowledge of any facts relevant to the allegations of any pleading filed by any party to
the action . . . .” NEV. R. CIV. P. 16.1(b)(5) (emphasis added).
24
See, e.g., Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)—’Much Ado About Nothing?’, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (1995); Bell et al., supra note
21.
25
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966).
26
See id.; Ronald D. Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 622, 622 n.3 (1976)
(reviewing MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975)).
26
The speech was given to a small audience of the District of Columbia Bar
Association. Freedman, supra note 25, at 1469 n.1.
27
See id.; MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM viii
(1975).
28
See, e.g., 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 29.22, at p. 29-39 (“The most
unqualified defense of loyalty to client interests is associated with Professor Monroe
Freedman.”).
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29

lawyer has a duty to disclose his client’s perjury and on the related
30
issue of the extent of a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality to his client.
Many of the articles on the perjury dilemma and the duty of
confidentiality briefly cite Frankel’s The Search for Truth (and his book
31
Partisan Justice, which grew out of the article) for the proposition
that adversary combat may not be the most effective means of arriving
32
at the truth.
Indeed, the tension between the lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality to the client and the lawyer’s duty of candor to the
33
court came to be known as the Freedman–Frankel debate. Very few
of these articles, however, advocate implementing Frankel’s proposals
or seriously address the issue of a lawyer’s responsibility for truth in
34
an adversarial system.
Reflecting on this phenomenon two decades after the
publication of The Search for Truth, Frankel told an ethics symposium
audience that Freedman’s three propositions, notwithstanding the
controversy they had inspired, “are really either moot or immaterial.
They have served as substitutes for, or diversions from, a broader and
more
fundamental
question,
namely,
whether
. . . criminal lawyers, supposedly to defend the rights of the innocent,
35
should routinely [thwart] the search for truth . . . .” Frankel pointed
29

See, e.g., 2 id.:
The client perjury problem . . . puts the dilemma of the adversary
system into sharp focus, for it is in this context that the clash between
the truth-seeking function and the interests of clients becomes most
intense. Much of the literature about the perjury problem is also
literature about the role of lawyers in the adversary system, and vice
versa. The vast literature about the confidentiality rule likewise
intersects both of these issues.
30
See 1 id. § 9.3, at pp. 9-10 to 9-14. For lists of some of the articles that appeared
at around the same time as The Search for Truth, see 1 id. § 9.3, at pp. 9-10 to 9-13; 2 id.
§ 29.22, at pp. 29-39 to 29-40; Pye, supra note 7, at 924 n.17.
31
MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980).
32
See, e.g., R.W. Nahstoll, The Lawyer’s Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality,
41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 421, 439 n.17 (1984); Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan,
The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
935, 949 (2002); Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 810–11
n.7 (1977); Ronald Evan Alper, Comment, Proposed Client Perjury: A Criminal Defense
Attorney’s Alternatives, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 248, 249 n.9 (1983).
33
See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 29.22, at p. 29-40; see also Crystal, supra
note 11, at 711.
34
See generally sources cited supra note 32. One article in this area that does
obliquely address the lawyer’s responsibility for truth is Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1041 (1997).
35
Marvin E. Frankel, Clients’ Perjury and Lawyers’ Options, 1 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL
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out that Freedman had later repudiated his third proposition (that a
lawyer has a duty to give legal advice that may help the client to
36
commit perjury), and that Freedman’s second proposition (that a
lawyer has a duty to put an untruthful witness on the stand) has been
37
Furthermore, Frankel argued, in real life a
generally rejected.
lawyer rarely has to decide whether to present untruthful testimony.
The client-perjury problem is therefore mostly an academic one. The
larger problem for Frankel was what to do about the various
techniques that defense lawyers routinely use to conceal and distort
38
the truth.
In reality, Frankel probably made a mistake when he said that all
three of Freedman’s propositions are moot. If Frankel was correct
that a defense lawyer rarely must decide between assisting perjury and
betraying the client, whereas they do routinely use an arsenal of tricks
to subvert the truth, then Freedman’s first proposition—that a lawyer
has a duty to discredit a truthful witness—should still be relevant.
And yet, that issue has provoked far less discussion than the client
perjury question.
The most notable article to address the discrediting of truthful
39
witnesses came from Harry Subin in 1987.
Subin agreed with
Frankel’s critique of the adversary system and of criminal defense
lawyers’ techniques for subverting truth, especially the use of crossexamination to discredit witnesses whom the lawyer knows to be
40
telling the truth.
A former criminal defense attorney, Subin
41
attempted to refute Freedman’s views with some care. Subin did not

ETHICS 25, 26 (1996).
36
Id. at 27 (citing FREEDMAN, supra note 27, at 59–76).
37
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional
Responsibility do not countenance the presentation of perjurious testimony. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), (7) (1981).
38
Frankel, Clients’ Perjury and Lawyers’ Options, supra note 35, at 28–29, 37.
39
Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: Reflections on the “Right”
to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987). For another consideration
of defense tactics, including undermining truthful witnesses, that appeared at about
the same time, see Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False and the False
Look True, 41 SW. L.J. 1135 (1988). Schwartz argues that Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157
(1986)—with Chief Justice Burger’s description of “the very nature of a trial as a
search for truth,” id. at 166—suggests that defense tactics that make false statements
or testimony look true and true statements or testimony look false are “highly
suspect, if not clearly improper.” Schwartz, supra, at 1138.
40
Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”, supra note 39, at 128, 135–36.
41
Id. at 129–49.
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directly discuss Frankel’s proposals; instead, he made his own. Subin
suggested a rule that would prohibit a criminal defense attorney who
knows the truth of a fact in the state’s case from “attempt[ing] to
refute that fact through the introduction of evidence, impeachment
42
of evidence, or argument.”
This proposed rule differs from
Frankel’s original proposals in that it does not impose a duty to (1)
disclose material information; (2) refrain from presenting misleading
statements; or (3) elicit the whole truth from witnesses. That is, the
Subin rule merely prohibits making the true look false; it does not
prohibit making the false look true.
Subin’s article, which provoked a thoughtful response by John
43
44
Mitchell and a rejoinder by Subin himself , has proved, like The
Search for Truth, to be influential for its general critique rather than
45
for its specific proposal.
One of the few people who supported
Subin’s proposed rule was Frankel. In the 1996 presentation
excerpted above, Frankel did not mention his own proposals of two
decades earlier, but he concluded that Subin’s rule would be the best
46
one for the adversary system as we know it today.
Murray L. Schwartz has pointed out that the standard
justifications of truth-defeating tactics “appeal to the role of the
47
defense attorney in a criminal trial.” These rationales do not apply
to the civil trial, because, Schwartz argued, the paramount purpose of
42

Id. at 149.
John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to
Professor Subin’s Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 339 (1987); see also infra note 62.
44
Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a
False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689 (1987).
45
See, e.g., W. William Hodes, The Lawyers: Lord Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury
Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075, 1085 n.26 (1996); David
Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer–Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1027 & n.87 (1990); Eleanor W. Myers &
Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discrediting the Truthful Witness: Demonstrating the Reality of
Adversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055, 1062 (2000); W. Bradley Wendel, Civil
Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 371 & n.37 (2004); see also Frankel, Clients’ Perjury
and Lawyers’ Options, supra note 35, at 27 (“[E]ight whole years after the way was
lighted, we seem no closer to accepting Professor Subin’s sound conclusion than we
were when he stated it. The notion that criminal defense lawyers, of all people, owe
a duty not to obstruct the search for the truth remains a heresy, both in theory and
in practice.”).
46
Frankel, Clients’ Perjury and Lawyers’ Options, supra note 35, at 26.
47
See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 150, 157 (1983) [hereinafter THE
GOOD LAWYER].
43
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a civil trial is to accurately reconstruct what happened, not to avoid
error in one direction. Schwartz contended that civil litigators
should therefore be governed by rules that are more truth-serving
and that Frankel’s proposal would be “[a] good start in that
48
direction.”
Aside from these contributions, a large number of articles have
debated, often with reference to Frankel’s publications, the merits of
the American adversary system and whether it does enough to
49
promote truth.
Most of those critics, however, focus only on
50
criminal justice, and few have engaged Frankel’s proposal.
B. Debating Frankel’s Proposal
Writers who have seriously engaged Frankel’s proposals have
argued that (1) in an adversary system, other values take precedence
over truth; (2) an adversary process designed to reach the truth
necessarily sometimes obscures truth; (3) Frankel’s proposals would
weaken the attorney–client relationship and discourage effective
representation; and (4) Frankel’s proposals are impracticable.
One strand of argument against Frankel’s proposals rejects the
idea that truth should be accorded a higher priority in an adversary
trial. This position has been argued most forcefully by Monroe
51
Freedman, but others have made similar points. Freedman, in a
52
response that was published alongside Frankel’s article, argued that
the American legal system serves other values, like the promotion of

48

Id. at 158–60.
See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469 (1992); The
Honorable Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271
(1987); Charles Pulaski, Jr., Criminal Trials: A “Search for Truth” or Something Else?, 16
CRIM. L. BULL. 41 (1980); Jay Sterling Silver, Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on
the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (1994); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1992).
50
See generally sources cited supra note 49.
51
See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37
MERCER L. REV. 647, 651 (1986) (arguing that the adversary system is not a search for
truth, but rather “a competition to win” that is supposed to promote goals of
substantive law). For a penetrating explanation of what is wrong with Saltzburg’s
account of the adversary system—namely, that Saltzburg is simply redefining theory
so that it approximates practice, and that correctly applying substantive law depends
on accurate fact-finding—see Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating
the Place of Truth in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 799, 839–42.
52
Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060
(1975).
49
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individual dignity, in addition to truth. Serving individual dignity,
Freedman contended, might sometimes require subordinating—and
hence, distorting—truth. One example is the constitutional privilege
53
against self-incrimination.
Freedman quoted United States
Supreme Court justices who have supported defense attorneys’
obligation to defend clients vigorously, regardless of whether they are
54
guilty. None of the quoted passages explain why this duty exists or
what makes it more important than truth, but Freedman offered the
following explanation: “Before we will permit the state to deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, we require that certain processes
which ensure regard for the dignity of the individual be followed,
55
irrespective of their impact on the determination of truth.”
Freedman’s response to Frankel essentially ended there,
although as a logical matter, his answer was not complete. Freedman
did not explain why dignity requires processes that distort the truth.
That is, even if dignity is of paramount concern, and the only way to
serve dignity is through process, it is not clear why that process must
override the truth. Freedman does not explain why dignity would be
at risk under procedures designed to promote rather than
subordinate truth.
Others have completed this line of reasoning by arguing that an
attorney’s loyalty has a value and that Frankel’s proposals would
interfere with that loyalty by creating a duty to further the other side’s
case. For example, in Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System, Freedman
56
argued that dignity requires the right to an advocate; that an
advocate can only be effective if the client confides in him; and that
the client will not confide in the lawyer unless the lawyer can promise
53

Id. at 1063–65.
See, e.g., id. at 1064 (“‘[A]s part of the duty imposed on the most honorable
defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has
little, if any, relation to the search for truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)).
Freedman also quotes Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966): “‘[T]he lawyer in fulfilling his professional responsibilities of
necessity may become an obstacle to truthfinding.’” Freedman, supra note 52, at
1064 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
55
Id. at 1065.
56
FREEDMAN, supra note 27, at 4–8. This book’s first chapter appears to have
been the source of certain portions of Freedman’s response to Frankel. Freedman
actually presented a version of this argument in his 1966 article, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, supra note 25,
but a reference to the book is helpful because its text literally picks up where the
response to Frankel left off.
54
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57

absolute confidence.
In addition, Albert Alschuler argued that
Frankel’s proposals would divide the lawyer’s duty to his client—a
duty that has non-instrumental value because it promotes a sense of
58
fair treatment.
Similarly, H. Richard Uviller, in a response
published alongside Frankel’s article, worried that making lawyers
responsible for the truth would create an “affirmative duty of
59
betrayal.”
Such a duty would violate the individualistic values
60
embodied in criminal procedure.
A second strand of argument against the proposition that
lawyers should be responsible for the truth is that an adversary system
designed to arrive at the truth will sometimes obscure the truth.
Uviller contended that defense counsel cannot necessarily know or
recognize the truth and that Frankel “proceeds from the assumption
that the shining Truth is known or knowable by all diligent lawyers
61
acting in good faith.” According to Uviller, defense counsel might
not know or recognize “the truth” because cases are tried not on “the
62
truth,” but on evidence, which is rarely unambiguous. A defense
57

For an effective critique of this argument, see Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal
Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 47, at 123, 144.
58
Albert Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among Many
or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 350–55 (1981). In response,
Frankel asserted that the concept of a hallowed duty of loyalty is nothing more than a
self-serving romantic vision. He explained that the duty as it exists now really stems
from an amoral commercial relationship. To illustrate this point, Frankel pointed
out that the duty of prosecutors to remain truthful overrides their loyalty to the
complaining witness, towards whom they have a certain obligation and, typically,
feelings of affinity. The only significant difference, Frankel said, between a defense
attorney and a prosecutor, is that the prosecutor is not being paid by the
complaining witness. The reality, argued Frankel, is that in letting confidentiality to
the client trump the truth, the lawyer may be serving the client’s interest, but the
lawyer is probably disserving someone else’s interest at the same time. Frankel
contended that an honest balancing of goods argues in favor of a duty to tell the
truth. Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 52
U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 54–56, 61–62 (1982). As for the problem of the prosecutor’s
divided duty, Frankel used the example of fiduciaries—like corporate officers and
directors—who have complex, divided duties: “[T]he learned professionals who
formulated such difficult obligations are not incapable of simultaneously serving
clients and not lying to courts.” Id. at 62–63.
59
H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to
Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1073–74 (1975).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1077.
62
Id. at 1076–79; see also Mitchell, supra note 43, at 345 (responding to Subin’s
proposal that a defense lawyer should not attempt to impeach facts that he knows are
true by arguing that “in a trial there are no such things as facts. There is only
information, lack of information, and chains of inferences therefrom”).
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should not be shaped by the defense lawyer’s personal evaluation of
the true state of affairs, for it is not the defense lawyer’s job to
63
evaluate credibility.
Even when a defense lawyer knows to a certainty which facts are
true and which are not, there is still an interest, Uviller suggests, in
holding the state to its burden of proof. The adversary system is
designed to prevent the conviction of innocent persons at the
expense of acquitting some guilty ones. This goal is served by having
a defense lawyer relentlessly challenge the state’s case, even when the
64
defense lawyer knows that the case has merit.
Uviller also argued that there is a difference between “ultimate
65
and . . . instrumental facts.”
He used the example of a lawyer
defending a man whom the lawyer believes committed the robbery
with which he is charged. If the defense attorney believes that a
witness’ testimony is false, “[a]ttacking that witness serves the
66
instrumental truth but may defeat the ultimate truth.” A defender
of Frankel’s proposition, according to Uviller, must choose between
prohibiting truth-defeating tactics and allowing defense counsel to
67
keep all evidence truthful. Uviller’s position, however, appears to be
flawed. Frankel did not claim that a lawyer must countenance
untruthful means in the service of truthful ends. Frankel’s proposal
would not have prevented a lawyer from attacking a false witness,
even if the result were to prevent the emergence of the ultimate
truth.
Another response to Frankel’s proposal was instrumental:
Making lawyers affirmatively responsible for the truth would have
undesirable side effects. Albert Alschuler, for example, suggests that
protecting confidentiality does not impair the search for truth
because the purpose of confidentiality is to induce disclosures to the
attorney that the client would not make (and therefore, no one
would know) in the absence of the protection. Under Frankel’s
proposals, therefore, a client would refrain from revealing material

63

Uviller, supra note 59, at 1077.
Id. at 1078–79. Mitchell made a similar point by arguing that because factual
guilt is not at issue in a criminal trial, raising alternative possibilities and casting
doubt on the prosecution’s case is not presenting a “false case,” but rather
introducing “reasonable doubts.” Mitchell, supra note 43, at 346.
65
Uviller, supra note 59, at 1077.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1077–78.
64
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68

adverse facts.
Uviller argued that in the commercial context,
impairing confidence might be undesirable because the lawyer often
obtains complete disclosure from the client, and the lawyer can use
69
the disclosures to steer the client away from unlawful activities.
William T. Pizzi has argued that if a lawyer were required to disclose
adverse information, the lawyer might strategically avoid obtaining
70
full knowledge. A defender of Frankel’s proposals might respond
that under those proposals, a lawyer would be prohibited from
avoiding full knowledge so as to be able to tell half-truths to the
court.
Finally, critics have argued that Frankel’s proposals are
impracticable and that a lawyer simply could not function in the
American system under the duties Frankel proposed. Stephen
Saltzburg, for example, argued that lawyers always emphasize and
deemphasize facts to make their version of a case as persuasive as
possible. To require them to do otherwise—as Frankel’s duties not to
make misleading statements and to elicit the whole truth when
71
examining witnesses would have entailed—”simply would not work.”
Similarly, Pizzi has argued that the defects of the adversary system are
68

Alschuler, supra note 58, at 350, 352. In response to this argument, Frankel
asserted that not all clients want to lie or conceal the truth, and those that do want to
lie or conceal the truth can do so without legal help. However, Frankel wrote,
untruthful clients will lie to their lawyers, as they often do anyway. Finally, Frankel
claimed that even if both lawyers and clients are such scoundrels that a duty to tell
the truth will not result in more accurate fact-finding, at least such a duty will prevent
lawyers from being accomplices to villainy. Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued,
supra note 58, at 57–59, 63.
It is worth mentioning that neither Frankel, Freedman, nor Alschuler (or
anyone else for that matter) had convincing answers to the fundamental question of
whether empirically, confidentiality rules produce outcomes that are more or less
accurate. See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to
Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1163 (1985). The results of one limited
empirical investigation suggest that Frankel had the better argument. Fred C.
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989); see also Leslie C.
Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to
Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81 (1994); cf. Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice
and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 315, 401–13 (1991) (proposing an analytical
framework for determining the effect of confidentiality rules on information
sharing).
69
Uviller, supra note 59, at 1072.
70
William T. Pizzi, Judge Frankel and the Adversary System, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 357,
365 (1981). Presumably, a lawyer might also be chilled from conducting additional
investigations in search of evidence beneficial to the client because the investigations
could turn up information that is damaging to the client.
71
Saltzburg, supra note 51, at 682.
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not due to the ethical failings of lawyers, but rather inhere in the
structure of the American trial. Using ethical rules to curb excesses is
unlikely to succeed because the incentives of the adversary system
72
place great pressures on the rules of professional conduct. As for
Frankel’s duty to disclose all relevant evidence, Saltzburg argued that
a lawyer does not know his adversary’s strategy and therefore is not
73
able to judge what is relevant in advance.
The arguments presented so far are the major ones the academy
has leveled against Frankel’s proposals over the years. The criticisms
voiced by the bar when it was confronted with the actual possibility of
having to abide by the Frankel proposals are discussed in Part II.
C. Frankel’s Proposal Today
Frankel’s proposal is still standard reading in legal ethics
74
75
textbooks, but almost no one seems to be seriously endorsing it. A
72

Pizzi, supra note 70, at 363–65. Pizzi suggested that it would be more effective
to change the structure of trials in ways that would blend elements of the continental
trial procedure—for example, (1) letting judges control questioning of witnesses,
with lawyers filling in gaps; (2) replacing opening and closing statements with an
outline of the case from the bench; and (3) permitting witnesses to ask questions of
each other. Id. at 365–66. Pizzi has adhered to the view that the defects of the
American trial are attributable to defects in structure, not defects in ethics. See
WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 221–33 (1999). But see id. at 223. (“No
other system permits the kind of behavior from advocates that is not only tolerated in
American courtrooms, but considered completely normal and ethical.”).
73
Saltzburg, supra note 51, at 683. Frankel once anticipated this argument. His
response was that “[i]n the general run of cases . . . we are indeed able to know as
lawyers what our adversaries would be delighted to have from us in the way of
evidence.” In fact, it is through knowing what evidence an adversary would find
useful that lawyers are effective at withholding information. Frankel also pointed out
that the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is defined in terms of
what evidence would help the defendant. Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued,
supra note 58, at 56.
74
See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICS 404–09, 417–18 (6th ed. 2002); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L.
RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 231–41 (3d ed.
1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD 180–82 (2d ed. 1998).
75
Two articles that have done so in the past fifteen years are Eugene R. Gaetke,
Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989) and W. Bradley Wendel,
Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895 (1996). Gaetke argued that lawyers
should either stop referring to themselves as officers of the court or give meaning to
that characterization, and he approvingly cited Frankel’s proposals as one way
lawyers could do so. Gaetke, supra, at 88–90. Wendel proposed, for purposes of
discovery only, a set of principles that included the following: (1) “With respect to
matters of fact, the lawyer’s primary obligation is to the discovery of truth rather than
to the advancement of the client’s interest, unless some clear countervailing interest
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recent article arguing that prosecutors should be placed under an
affirmative duty to promote the truth did not mention Frankel’s
76
proposals.
Another article, suggesting that the Model Rules be
amended to require lawyers to disclose relevant information about
77
“procedural matters,” also failed to cite Frankel. In 2000, after a
three-year deliberative process, the ABA approved changes that
78
slightly expand the duty of candor to the tribunal, but without
citation to Frankel.
Several factors could explain why Frankel’s proposals are no
longer the subject of serious discussion. For one thing, Frankel’s
proposals may have struck most people as quixotic (in the case of the
duty not to make misleading statements) or unworkable (in the case
of the duty to disclose all relevant evidence). Moreover, the process
that resulted in the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983 showed that reforming the profession through
changes in ethics rules was something of a hopeless cause. In 1985,
Deborah Rhode referred to “the bar’s demonstrated parochialism in
79
enacting and enforcing ethical standards.” As Part II will show, the
bar proved in the late 1970s and 1980s that it was not ready to allow
anything even close to Frankel’s proposal to be adopted.
Another possible reason why reform-minded commentators are
not discussing Frankel’s proposals is that they are interested in the
possibility of deep structural and institutional reform. Critics of the
adversary system appear to be more interested in the possibility of
borrowing elements from the continental systems than in modifying
80
the ethics requirements in the American system. In recent books,
is recognized[]”; and (2) “It is a breach of the lawyer’s duty as an officer of the court
to fail to disclose information that would assist the tribunal in determining the case
on its merits.” Wendel, supra, at 935.
76
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
309 (2001).
77
William H. Fortune, A Proposal to Require Lawyers to Disclose Information About
Procedural Matters, 87 KY. L.J. 1099 (1998).
78
See infra text accompanying notes 128–33.
79
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
641 (1985).
80
See, e.g., PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH, supra note 72; Albert W. Alshuler,
Lawyers and Truth-Telling, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 189 (2003) (commenting
that the approach of critics, exemplified by John Langbein, who “would give judges
greater independent responsibility for truth-seeking,” seems more promising than
the approach of critics, exemplified by Frankel, who “would give lawyers greater
responsibility for truth-telling”); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of
the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997);
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two prominent and articulate proponents of reform in the legal
profession have supported Frankel’s proposals, but also implied that
those proposals are unlikely to be enacted without fundamental
81
changes in attitudes, regulatory systems, and incentive structures.
Those same commentators present Frankel’s concerns as simply one
82
branch of a larger problem.
II. FRANKEL’S PROPOSAL AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ETHICS
The 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct grew out of a
83
post-Watergate attempt to reform legal ethics.
In 1977, the
president of the American Bar Association, William B. Spann, Jr.,
appointed Omaha lawyer Robert Kutak to chair a commission

Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (1996).
Strier considered all of the rules and tactics that defeat truth in jury trials, and then
proposed a wide variety of specific reforms, including (1) modifying exclusionary
rules; (2) changing the composition of juries, i.e., improving the overall caliber of
jurors, eliminating peremptory challenges, using specially qualified juries, and using
mixed courts; (3) limiting witness coaching; and (4) giving judges more control over
the proceedings. Id. at 162, 166–72, 175–78, 179–80. Strier supported his arguments
with data from surveys of judges and jurors as to their attitudes about some of these
reforms. Id. at 100. Strier did not, however, engage or even mention Frankel’s
proposals. See generally id.
81
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has proposed, among other additions, a Frankel-style
change to the ethics codes: “Lawyers should not misrepresent or conceal a relevant
fact or legal principle to another person (including opposing counsel, parties,
judicial officers, third-party neutrals, or other individuals who might rely on such
statements).” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 136 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000). Menkel-Meadow then writes, “I have no expectation that such
‘golden rules’ of lawyer behavior would ever be adopted by any regulatory or bar
disciplinary body.” Id. Likewise, Rhode writes:
In the long run . . . major improvement in adversarial practices will
require major changes in bar ethical codes, enforcement patterns, and
incentive structures. . . . If American lawyers viewed the adversary
process more as a search for truth and less as a sporting event, then
such requirements would not appear unjust. . . . The prospects for that
agenda will depend on securing greater commitment from those
within the profession and greater pressure from those outside it.
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
93–95 (2000).
82
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 81, at 130; Rhode, supra note 81, at 105.
83
For a good overview of the process that produced the Model Rules, see
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 60–63 (student ed. 1986). For a
fascinating account of the politics behind the process, see Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
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84

charged with a comprehensive review of legal ethics.
Spann
apparently “wanted a critical and outward-looking drafting committee
in order to counteract the narrower and more traditional views that
85
would prevail in the [ABA’s] House of Delegates.”
One of the
86
people appointed to the commission was Judge Marvin Frankel.
87
Over the next six years, the Kutak Commission produced a series of
drafts, each less reformist than the one before. As this section will
show, early drafts reflected Frankel’s views, but those views were
gradually washed out of later versions. Although the lawyer’s duty of
candor has been broadened in recent years, prevailing legal ethics
standards are still far from what Frankel envisioned.
88
The 1979 draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct was
the Kutak Commission’s earliest and most reformist. The rule on
candor to the tribunal prohibited any “knowing misrepresentation of
fact” (“misrepresentation” presumably includes misleading
89
statements in addition to false ones). The rule also prohibited a
lawyer from offering “without suitable explanation evidence that the
lawyer knows is substantially misleading,” and it required the lawyer
to disclose any fact, even if adverse, when the disclosure was necessary
to correct a misapprehension, or when the fact “would probably have
90
a substantial effect on the determination of a material issue of fact.”
91
Some of the provisions did not apply to criminal defense lawyers.
This rule would have compelled the disclosure of virtually all material
facts.
The stated purpose of the provisions dealing with the disclosure
of adverse facts was to address the limited circumstances in which an
adversary should have presented a decisive fact, but did not do so.
That is, the rule was designed to correct situations in which the
84

Schneyer, supra note 83, at 677.
Id. at 694–95.
86
Id. at 693.
87
The official name of the Kutak Commission was the Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards. See Chair’s Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chair_intro.html (Sept. 1983).
88
See Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 27,
1979, at 26–47 [hereinafter MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (leaked draft 1979)].
89
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2(a)(2) (leaked draft 1979), published in
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 36. For the full text of the draft rule, see the
Appendix of this Article. This draft, and subsequent ones, also contained enhanced
duties of candor with respect to adverse law, see id. R. 3.2(a)(5), but those changes
are outside the scope of this Article.
90
Id. R. 3.2(a)(3)(iii).
91
See id. R. 3.2.
85
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adversary system—whose ability to reach truth is premised on the
belief that competing adversaries will ferret out all relevant facts—
92
”manifestly has suffered breakdown.”
The 1979 Draft rule
resembled the proposal made several years earlier in The Search for
Truth, and, like certain other reforms in the draft, the rule was almost
93
certainly driven by Frankel himself.
The 1979 Draft was self-consciously bold. The official comment
to the draft rule regarding the duty of candor seems to echo
Frankel’s skepticism of adversarial zeal. The comment begins with
the pronouncement that “[t]he duty to represent a client vigorously,
and therein to maintain confidences of the client, is qualified by the
94
advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal.” The prevailing standard
on disclosure of adverse facts, the comment says, “relieves the careful
advocate from responsibility for miscarried justice resulting from the
inadequacies of an opponent [and has resulted] both in individual
injustice and in the disrepute into which the adjudicative process has
95
fallen: It is time the rule was changed.”
The Commission never did officially release the 1979 Draft.
Rather, at a program held to promote the Commission’s efforts,
Kutak showed the draft to Monroe Freedman. Freedman was
outraged at the diminished confidentiality protections.
He
96
denounced the draft and apparently leaked it to the press. The bar
was also outraged, both at the secrecy with which the draft had been
developed and at specific provisions, especially the proposed duty of
candor and the proposed limit on the confidentiality of attorney–
92

Id. cmt.
The records of the Kutak Commission’s early meetings reveal that Frankel’s
concerns occupied a substantial amount of the Commission’s attention. One of the
most hotly debated issues for the Commission was whether a duty to reveal client
fraud should trump the duty of confidentiality. In fact, the journals summarizing the
discussions at the Commission’s preliminary meetings reveal that among the
Commission members themselves, this question was known as the “Frankel problem.”
See Journals of the ABA Special Committee on the Evaluation of Professional
Standards, Aspen, 1977, at 29 [hereinafter Kutak Comm’n Journals]. The “Frankel
Problem” was first in a list of problems with the Model Code prepared by one
Commission member. Id. At Frankel’s urging, the Commission debated broadening
a lawyer’s duty of candor to the court. Frankel proposed that “the duty of the
prosecution to disclose material evidence ought to be extended to defense counsel as
well, subject only to applicable laws of privilege which are not matters of ethics.”
Kutak Comm’n Journals, supra, N.Y., Dec. 1977, at 31.
94
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. (leaked draft 1979), published in
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 36.
95
Id.
96
Schneyer, supra note 83, at 702.
93
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97

client communications. The Kutak Commission watered down some
of its reforms before releasing for comment its first public draft,
98
known as the “Discussion Draft” of 1980.
For the Frankel-inspired duty of candor, the Discussion Draft
99
entailed something of a retreat.
This draft dropped the
requirement that a lawyer disclose a fact that “would probably have a
100
substantial effect on the determination of a material issue of fact.”
By contrast, the Discussion Draft retained the requirement that a
lawyer disclose adverse facts when “necessary to correct a manifest
misapprehension resulting from a previous representation the lawyer
101
has made to the tribunal.”
The comment following the duty of
candor provision was similar to the comment in the 1979 rule, but

97

See Ethics Draft Ignites Uproar, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at 1, cited in Schneyer,
supra note 83, at 702.
98
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980). There
were other drafts besides the 1980 Discussion Draft, of which the most widely
published was the Proposed Final Draft of 1981, and each draft elicited comments.
See COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS’N, WORKING DRAFT:
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1 (March 21, 1981); COMM’N ON
EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS’N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT: MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (May 30, 1981) [hereinafter MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981)].
99
The Kutak Commission also retreated on the duty of confidentiality. The most
dramatic changes from the leaked draft to the Discussion Draft appear to be that
where the leaked draft would have required disclosure when necessary “to prevent
the client from committing an act that would seriously endanger the life or safety of a
person, result in wrongful detention or incarceration of a person or wrongful
destruction of substantial property, or corrupt judicial or governmental procedure,”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b)(1) (leaked draft 1979), published in
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 28, the Discussion Draft would have required
disclosure “to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing
an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm to another person.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
This provision and others were further narrowed in subsequent drafts. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (“A lawyer
may reveal [information relating to the representation of a client] to the extent the
lawyer believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm, or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another[.]”);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (“A lawyer may reveal
[information relating to the representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm[.]”).
100
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (Discussion Draft 1980). The full
relevant text is reprinted in the Appendix of this Article.
101
Id. R. 3.1(d)(ii).
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102

the consciously critical tone of the 1979 Draft had been moderated.
The Discussion Draft received widespread attention in the press
103
104
(where the reforms met with approval),
bar journals,
and
105
The Kutak Commission solicited comments on the
academia.
106
Discussion Draft from a wide cross section of the bar.
In general,
107
Some of the
the bar reacted negatively to the Discussion Draft.
most common complaints concerned the organization of the new
rules, proposed mandatory pro bono requirements, and the
108
diminished confidentiality protections.
Some lawyers were concerned that the new duties of candor and
confidentiality, by compromising the attorney–client relationship,
would impair a lawyer’s ability to function effectively in the adversary
109
system.
The New Jersey Bar Association complained that Rule
3.1(a)(3) of the Discussion Draft, which prohibited offering
“substantially misleading” evidence, “plays havoc with the adversary
system” by requiring the advocate “to function as an extension of the
102

Id. R. 3.1 cmt.
Schneyer, supra note 83, at 696–97.
104
See generally, e.g., Symposium, Proposed New ABA Code, 54 CONN. B. J. 259 (1980);
Carol Grant, Attorney–Client Privilege and the Proposed Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, 6 NAT’L J. CRIM. DEFENSE 163 (1980).
105
See generally, e.g., Review Symposium, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 921; Robert J. Kutak, The Rules of Professional Conduct in an
Era of Change, 29 EMORY L.J. 889 (1980); James H. Stark, The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 12 CONN. L. REV. 948 (1980).
106
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface (Discussion Draft 1980).
107
See generally COMPILATION OF COMMENTS ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., ed., 1980) [hereinafter HAZARD, COMMENTS].
108
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ii–vi (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
109
For example, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants wrote:
Taken as a whole, the Model Rules . . . reflect a retreat from the
traditional view of a lawyer’s role as confidant and zealous
representative of the client. The traditional view of the lawyer’s role
has generally been accepted as beneficial not only to the client but to
the judicial system and society as well. The protection afforded to
clients’ confidences under the present Code increases the likelihood
that a client will exhibit candor toward the lawyer and will consult with
counsel. This enables the lawyer to act more effectively in meeting
obligations to the client, the court and the community. . . . [G]reatly
enlarging the circumstances in which disclosure of information
regarding a client is permitted, or mandating such disclosure, may very
well reduce candor and further erode the effectiveness and credibility
of our legal system.
3 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, § O-40, at 27–28 (response of ABA Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants).
103
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110

court in a truth-seeking role.”
The Association argued that this
provision could have the same effect as the recently dropped
requirement that a lawyer volunteer adverse evidence because the
withholding of such evidence often has a misleading effect. “The
requirement for candor on the part of the lawyer,” the Association
argued, “must be tempered by the need for preserving the integrity of
111
the adversary system.”
The New Jersey Bar Association also expressed concern over the
112
requirement that a lawyer take affirmative steps to address the prior
presentation of false evidence. The Association suggested that the
rule be limited so as to require disclosure only when the false
evidence amounts to a fraud on another person or the court, writing
that it “recognizes the intent of this Rule and does not argue with its
purposes but feels that the Proposed Rule constitutes too great an
113
erosion of the lawyer–client relationship.”
The bar associations
critical of the proposed rules on confidentiality and candor generally
made arguments nearly identical to those voiced by the critics of
114
Frankel’s original proposal.
Not all bar associations were hostile toward the proposed rule.
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York said, “it approves
of the concept” of Rule 3.1(a)—including the prohibition on offering
115
misleading evidence—and criticized only the drafting.
Likewise,
116
117
the Omaha Bar Association indicated that it accepted the rule, as
did the Arkansas Bar Association, which stated that it “strongly
118
supports . . . this rule requiring candor toward a tribunal,” with one

110

1 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, Comments on Rule 3.1, at 3 (response
of Special Committee of the New Jersey Bar Ass’n).
111
1 Id.
112
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
113
1 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, Comments on Rule 3.1, at 4 (response
of Special Committee of the New Jersey Bar Ass’n).
114
See supra text accompanying notes 68–70.
115
1 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, Comments on Rule 3.1, at 12–14
(response of Committee on Professional & Judicial Ethics of the Ass’n of the Bar of
the City of New York).
116
It bears mention that Robert Kutak was one of the most prominent members
of the Omaha Bar.
For a professional biography of Robert Kutak, see
http://www.kutakrock.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=DspLinkDetail&link_id=82&site_i
d=0&cat=0 (Jan. 24, 2005).
117
3 HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107, § O-54, at 4 (response of Omaha Bar
Ass’n). 3 id. at 4–5.
118
3 id., § O-57, at 4 (response of Arkansas Bar Ass’n).
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minor exception.
The controversy provoked by the Discussion Draft led to the
“Proposed Final Draft” of May 30, 1981, which retreated almost
entirely from the original Frankel-influenced position.
The
affirmative duty to disclose adverse facts to the tribunal may not have
generated as much controversy as some of the other proposals in the
120
Discussion Draft, but the Kutak Commission was under intense
pressure, and it compromised most of its reforms.
The duty of candor provision in the 1981 Draft only prohibited
lawyers from (1) making false statements of fact; (2) failing to
disclose facts in a case in which silence is equivalent to a material
misrepresentation; (3) failing to disclose facts necessary to prevent a
fraud on the tribunal; and (4) offering false evidence. Additionally,
under the 1981 Draft, a lawyer who later learns that previously
presented evidence was false must take “reasonable remedial
121
measures.” Comparing the Discussion Draft to the 1981 Draft, the
1981 version disposed of (1) the rule prohibiting a lawyer from
presenting “substantially misleading” evidence; (2) the requirement
that a lawyer disclose facts, even if adverse, when necessary to correct
a manifest misapprehension resulting from a previous representation
by the lawyer; and (3) the specification that “reasonable remedial
measures” to rectify the consequences of false evidence may include
disclosing a client’s confidence or the fact that a client is implicated
in the falsification. In addition, the 1981 Draft limited the remedial
obligation to cases in which the false evidence is material.
The final version of the rules presented to and approved by the
ABA’s House of Delegates in 1983 contained even fewer constraints.
The prohibition on making false statements of fact was limited to
“material” facts, and the Rules dropped the last remnant of the
Frankel duties from the 1981 Draft—the requirement that a lawyer
affirmatively disclose facts when failing to do so would constitute a
122
material misrepresentation.
The bar was apparently unwilling to
119

The exception was a section of the rule that permitted attorneys to disclose
adverse evidence to the opposite party. The Arkansas Bar Association objected to
that section on the grounds that the provision would conflict with the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 id.
120
The most controversial proposals were those pertaining to pro bono
requirements, diminished confidentiality protections, and the enhanced duty to
disclose adverse law to the court. See generally HAZARD, COMMENTS, supra note 107.
121
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). (See the
Appendix of this Article for the text of the draft rule).
122
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983).
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accept ethics rules that proscribed any conduct short of fraud or
fabrication. The comments to the rules, however, did observe that
“[t]here are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the
123
equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.”
124
Frankel’s ideas did survive in one minor respect. Starting with
the initial leaked draft, the Kutak Commission had included
provisions that would put a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding under
two of the duties Frankel proposed in The Search for Truth—to disclose
125
all material evidence, and not to mislead the tribunal.
The
rationale was that with only one advocate, the normal fact-finding
process, in which the truth emerges from a clash of adversaries, could
126
not possibly function.
Those provisions survived the drafting
process, and today the rules require a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding
to “inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or
127
not the facts are adverse.”
Recently, the pendulum of the main duty of candor rule has
begun to swing in the direction of more truthfulness. The rule was
broadened by amendments approved in 2000 after a three-year
128
comprehensive review of the Model Rules.
Under the new rule, a
lawyer may not make any false statement of fact (the prohibition is no
longer limited to material facts), and a lawyer must now correct a
129
previous false statement of material fact.
The requirement that a
lawyer remedy the effects of presenting false evidence now applies
not just to evidence offered by the lawyer, but also to evidence
123

Id. R. 3.3 cmt.
The point that this provision reflects Frankel’s influence is made in Schneyer,
supra note 83, at 700 n.136.
125
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (leaked draft 1979), published in
LEGAL TIMES, supra note 88, at 39; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5
(Discussion Draft 1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
126
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2002).
127
Id. R. 3.3(d); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
112 (2000) (on Advocacy in Ex Parte Proceedings). It would be interesting to
research whether, in states that have adopted this requirement, it has made a
difference either in the case law or in general practice.
128
A complete overview and analysis of the history of the ethical duty of candor
would require substantial additional research that is beyond the scope of this Article,
including an examination of the legislative history of the 2000 amendments and the
commentary from the bar and the academy. However, based on the research that
has been conducted for this Article, the Frankel proposals were no longer a
reference point for the 2000 proposals. See supra text accompanying notes 74–82.
129
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002).
124
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offered by the lawyer’s client or a witness.
The rule also specifies
that a necessary remedy for the presentation of false evidence may be
131
disclosure that the evidence was false (language to that effect had
132
been dropped from the Discussion Draft ). Similarly, the rule
requiring affirmative disclosure of adverse facts when necessary to
avoid assisting in the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act has
been broadened to require that a lawyer take “reasonable remedial
measures” whenever the lawyer knows that a client intends to engage,
has engaged, or is currently engaging in “criminal or fraudulent
133
conduct related to the proceeding.”
Standards of legal ethics are still a far cry from those Frankel
envisioned. The text of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
134
Lawyers, which was adopted in 1998, largely tracks the Model Rules.
Like the Model Rules, the Restatement studiously avoids prescribing an
affirmative duty to help the tribunal reach the truth. Misleading
statements are not explicitly prohibited, and there is no affirmative
duty to disclose a fact that the other side failed to bring to the court’s
135
attention. Although the comment to the duty of candor rule in the
Model Rules states that “[t]here are circumstances where failure to
make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
136
misrepresentation,” the Restatement explicitly permits omissions
137
that are arguably misleading.
130

Id. R. 3.3(a)(3).
Id.
132
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
133
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2002). By contrast, the new rules
exempt criminal defense lawyers from the provision that formerly allowed all lawyers
to refuse to offer evidence that they reasonably believe is false. Id. R. 3.3(a)(4).
134
Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, §§ 112, 120 (on, respectively, Advocacy
in Ex Parte and Other Proceedings, and False Testimony or Evidence), with MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1998) (on the Duty of Candor), and MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002) (same). The reporter’s notes to section 120 of the
Restatement mention the unique New Jersey rule, together with a citation to The Search
for Truth.
135
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 120.
136
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3 cmt. (2002). This understanding
was reflected in the 1981 draft’s explicit requirement that a lawyer shall not “fail to
disclose a fact in circumstances where the failure to make the disclosure is the
equivalent of a lawyer’s making a material misrepresentation.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The fact that this
requirement was moved out of the text of the rule and into the comment suggests
that the framers of the Model Rules were reluctant to prohibit misleading omissions
categorically.
137
The section on false statements of fact includes an illustration in which a
131
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The lack of attention to the value of truth in contemporary
ethics standards is also reflected in the provisions governing the
questioning of witnesses. The Kutak Commission did not devote
much attention to the issue of whether lawyers should be allowed to
138
question witnesses in a way that misleads the trier of fact.
The
Restatement, as well as the annotations to the Model Rule on “Respect
139
for Rights of Third Persons,” imply that the truthfulness of the
impression created by the questioning is simply not an operative
140
constraint. Both authorities do little more than cite Subin’s article
141
and the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice.
The ABA Standards, which have been changed many times over
the past thirty years, do not impose a high standard of truthfulness,
nor are they worded strongly. Under the current version, “[a]
prosecutor should not use the power of cross-examination to
discredit or undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows the witness
142
is testifying truthfully.”
A prosecutor who strongly believes—yet
does not know for certain—that a witness is testifying truthfully is
defense lawyer knows that a contract signed by his client and the plaintiff’s decedent
was superceded by a materially revised version. In the illustration, the defense lawyer
elicits testimony from the defendant about “the contract that you and Plaintiff’s
decedent signed,” presents the original contract to the defendant, asks “Is this the
contract that you and Plaintiff’s decedent signed?,” and receives an affirmative reply
from the defendant. This constitutes a violation of the Restatement’s prohibition
against materially false evidence. By contrast, the defense lawyer will have violated
no provision in the Restatement if the lawyer does not first elicit the testimony, and the
plaintiff’s lawyer, unaware that the revised agreement was in writing, solicits oral
testimony from a third party to which the defense lawyer successfully objects under
the statute of frauds. The defendant lawyer obtains a directed judgment for his
client with no violation. RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 120 cmt. d, illus. 1-2. A
defense lawyer under a Frankel duty presumably would be required to disclose the
existence of the written document.
138
See generally Kutak Comm’n Journals, supra note 93. At one point in the
Commission’s early discussions, an unnamed member, possibly Frankel, suggested
that the draft rule on fairness to an opposing party and counsel “also proscribe[s]
attempts to induce witnesses to give untruthful or misleading evidence,” but this
suggestion does not appear to have occupied much discussion. Id., S.F., Dec. 1978, at
9.
139
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2002).
140
See supra note 39.
141
CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT 426–27 (4th. ed. 1999); RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 106 cmt. c,
reporter’s note.
142
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, Standard 3-5.7(b) (Prosecution Function) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 1149 (2001-2002 ed., John S.
Dzienkowski ed., 2001).
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presumably free to discredit that witness. For defense lawyers, the
corresponding provision imposes no obligation to the truth
whatsoever: “Defense counsel’s belief or knowledge that the witness is
144
telling the truth does not preclude cross-examination.”
The ABA
Standards also provide that prosecutors and defense attorneys should
not “ask a question which implies the existence of a factual predicate
145
for which a good faith belief is lacking.”
III. NEW JERSEY’S EXPERIENCE WITH RULE 3.3(A)(5)
A. Overview
A number of states have adopted the Model Rules, but some
state supreme courts have made changes to them—typically
diminishing to varying degrees the confidentiality protections that
146
the bar fought so hard to add to the Kutak Commission drafts. One
state, New Jersey (the first state to adopt the Model Rules), inserted
147
New Jersey’s duty of
an affirmative duty to disclose adverse facts.
candor rule tracked the 1983 Model Rule almost exactly, with one
major exception: Rule 3.3(a)(5) of the New Jersey Rules of
Professional Conduct required that a lawyer not knowingly “fail to
disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the
tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure.” This provision had
no equivalent in the Model Rules.
This unique requirement brought New Jersey, on paper at least,
closer than any American jurisdiction ever has been to implementing
the original Frankel proposals. A leading ethics treatise, Hazard and
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, characterized this requirement as “a
radical proposition indeed [that] begins to carry out [a] direct attack
148
on the adversary system.” Rule 3.3(a)(5), treated literally, would go
even further than the Kutak Commission’s Discussion Draft

143

Cf. id. (“The prosecutor’s belief that the witness is telling the truth does not
preclude cross-examination, but may affect the method and scope of crossexamination.”).
144
Id., Standard 4-7.6(b) (Defense Function), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES, supra note 142, at 1164.
145
Id. Standards 3-5.7(b), 4-7.6(d).
146
See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 83, at 713.
147
I have not researched whether, in the states besides New Jersey that adopted
the Model Rules, there was any discussion of inserting Frankel-type duties.
148
2 GEOFFREY A. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § AP4:104,
at 1264 (2d ed. 1990).
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(although not necessarily further than the leaked draft of 1979),
because it effectively makes the attorney responsible for a
misapprehension on the part of the tribunal that the attorney could
149
have prevented.
For example, if one lawyer fails to conduct
adequate discovery, and the opposing lawyer learns of a material
witness who could establish a particular fact, the second lawyer must
disclose the existence of the witness, even though that lawyer might
150
have won the case otherwise.
A statement that is literally true but
misleading because factually incomplete would likewise appear to
violate the rule. Hazard and Hodes describe such a regime as “a
‘processing’ system, in which lawyers on each side put the other side
through its paces, but cooperate in an effort to reach a ‘correct’ and
151
‘fair’ result.”
In 2003, the Supreme Court of New Jersey responded to
152
dissatisfaction with the rule by weakening it.
The new rule
prohibits a lawyer from “fail[ing] to disclose to the tribunal a material
fact knowing that the omission is reasonably certain to mislead the
tribunal, except that it shall not be a breach of this rule if the
153
disclosure is protected by a recognized privilege or is otherwise
154
prohibited by law.”
That is, a lawyer in New Jersey is no longer
required to disclose a material fact simply because the tribunal “may
tend to be misled” by that omission. The duty is only triggered if the
omission is reasonably certain to mislead. Additionally, the rule does
not require disclosure if the disclosure would violate a privilege or
other law.
This section recounts the history of New Jersey Rule 3.3(a)(5)’s
adoption, presents perspectives about it from the academy and the
155
practicing bar, and discusses its application.
Initially, Rule
149

The Discussion Draft’s affirmative disclosure requirement only applied to a
situation in which the court’s misapprehension was the result of a previous statement
the attorney had made. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(d)(ii) (Discussion
Draft 1980).
150
2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 148, § AP4:104, at 1264 n.4.
151
Id. at 1265.
152
The New Jersey Constitution gives the New Jersey Supreme Court exclusive
rule-making authority for the state’s constitutional courts. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2,
para. 3; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
153
This phrasing seems infelicitous. As a matter of semantics, a privilege does not
protect a disclosure, but rather, it protects a fact from being disclosed.
154
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(5) (2004).
155
This Article primarily deals with the first version of Rule 3.3(a)(5). The new
version of this rule only became effective January 1, 2004, and at the time this Article
was prepared, the new version had not been applied in any reported cases.
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3.3(a)(5) was used not to change the nature of adversarial combat,
but to discipline attorneys who commit manifest abuses—conduct
that judges would likely find objectionable under the more
permissive rules of other jurisdictions. In recent years, however, New
Jersey courts have used the rule to support various pronouncements
from the judiciary that lawyers are expected to be truthful. The most
156
significant such pronouncement came in the recent Seelig case, in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to be putting lawyers
on direct notice that they will be held to a higher standard of candor
than they would be in other jurisdictions.
B. The History of Rule 3.3(a)(5)
Rule 3.3(a)(5), along with other significant departures from the
157
Model Rules, was adopted solely on the initiative of the New Jersey
Supreme Court. The Court had convened a special committee
chaired by Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise to study the Model Rules
158
and recommend whether to adopt them in New Jersey.
The
Debevoise Committee recommended adopting the Model Rule on
the duty of candor as written; the committee said nothing about
extending the duty of candor to include affirmative disclosure
159
requirements.
But Chief Justice Wilentz was known to be
160
concerned about public confidence in the legal profession, and his
Court made a number of changes to the Debevoise Committee’s
recommendations—all of which were intended to strengthen a
lawyer’s obligation to the public, arguably at the expense of the duty
161
to the client.
156

180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004).
Another major change was to the confidentiality provisions. The ABA rules
permitted disclosure “to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). The rule adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court requires mandatory disclosure to prevent a client “from committing a
criminal, illegal, or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result
in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property
of another” or is likely to “perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.” N.J. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 1.6 (2002) (emphasis added to show departure from Model Rules).
158
See Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, N.J. LAW J., July 28, 1983, supp. at 1, 112 N.J.L.J. 93, supp. at 1.
159
Id. at 13.
160
Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Redefining of Professional Ethics
in New Jersey under Chief Justice Robert Wilentz: A Legacy of Reform, 7 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 351, 389 (1997).
161
See generally id. In a statement that accompanied the new rules, Chief Justice
157
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The inspiration for Rule 3.3(a)(5) is not entirely clear. The
comment that accompanies the rule states that the additional
provision applies to “facts that are at issue in the case as well as facts
relating to the management of the case,” and declares, with citations
to supporting cases, that “an attorney has an obligation to be candid
162
and act with good faith toward the tribunal.” As members of a
reform-minded court, the justices would presumably have been
familiar with the Kutak Commission’s earlier drafts, aware of the
debates surrounding those drafts, and interested in the reformist
proposals that the larger ABA rejected. However, I have been unable
to find evidence confirming that the Court was consciously following
163
the Kutak Commission drafts that reflected Frankel’s views.
Rule 3.3(a)(5) has been controversial from its inception. One
outspoken commentator has said that the provision
perhaps more than any other, illustrates the modification of the
adversary system so as to render it more consistent with the value
of truth. . . . The rule seems to conflict with the basic premise
that an advocate must present a client’s cause in its best light. It
has long been recognized that the lawyer has no duty to reveal
adverse facts or to come forward with adverse witnesses. . . . The
basic assumption is that the truth will emerge out of the clash of
164
adversarial presentation of the evidence.

This critic has complained as well that the rule poses constitutional
165
problems in the criminal setting.
The practicing New Jersey bar has also expressed concern.
When the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct were first
publicized, Raymond Trombadore, then Vice President of the New

Wilentz stated: “[W]e believe that these new [New Jersey] Rules of Professional
Conduct represent sound principles that protect the public and the integrity of the
legal profession and maintain New Jersey’s position as a leader in setting and
upholding high professional standards.” Press Release, Administrative Office of the
Courts: State of New Jersey, Rules of Professional Conduct (July 19, 1984) (cited in
Leslie Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 94–95 nn.50 & 51 (1994)).
162
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2002).
163
There are no records of the Court’s deliberations. Retired Justice Stewart
Pollock was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court at the time, and he cannot
recall the discussions about this issue, but he points out that the members of the
Court would have seen the earlier ABA drafts. Telephone Interview with Stewart
Pollock, Of Counsel, Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti (Jan. 4, 2003).
164
Michael P. Ambrosio, The “New” New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct: Reordered
Priorities for Public Accountability, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 121, 138 (1987).
165
Id. at 138–39.

642

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:613

Jersey State Bar Association, wrote to the Supreme Court that Rule
3.3(a)(5) had generated “near universal concern” and tried to
166
convince the Court not to implement it.
Several years later,
Trombadore, even though he was by then the chair of the New Jersey
Supreme Court Disciplinary Review Board, nonetheless told an ethics
symposium that the language of Rule 3.3(a)(5)
is so broad and so sweeping that it essentially destroys whatever
confidentiality exists between lawyer and client, because it is
totally unlimited. . . . I am satisfied, just from my knowledge of
practice, that the rule is violated, grossly violated, by every lawyer
who does trial work, because no lawyer can represent a client and
comply with that rule. . . . Obviously, everything unfavorable to
the client would have to be disclosed, because, without it the
167
tribunal might be misled.

Similarly, until the rule’s language was changed in 2003, the leading
handbook on ethics issues in New Jersey complained that the literal
meaning of the rule “is so far afield from accepted notions of
advocacy . . . that the precise letter of the rule is rarely honored other
168
than in the breach.”
The controversy has continued to this day. In 2001, the New
Jersey Supreme Court appointed a commission to study the New
Jersey rules in light of the ABA’s 2000 amendments to the Model
169
Rules.
The members of this Commission, which was chaired by
retired New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart Pollock, were aware
that New Jersey’s rule is unique, but they were not aware of the
original Frankel proposals and they did not discuss the similarity
between Rule 3.3(a)(5) and certain provisions in the early Kutak
170
Commission drafts that reflected Frankel’s views.
The Pollock
Commission debated extensively what to say about Rule 3.3(a)(5)
and decided by a close vote to recommend keeping the rule, but to
recognize in its report “the tension that the rule places on the

166

Letter from Raymond R. Trombadore, First Vice President, New Jersey State
Bar Ass’n, to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 2 (Aug. 9, 1984) (cited in Levin, supra
note 161, at 95 n.52).
167
Raymond R. Trombadore, The New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct: A Recipe for
Good Lawyering, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 606, 610 (1988).
168
KEVIN H. MICHELS, NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY ETHICS 605 (Gann 2003).
169
See REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/
reports/2002finalreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
170
Telephone Interview with Stewart Pollock, supra note 163.
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171

attorney–client relationship.”
172
In a telephone conversation, Justice Pollock acknowledged
that there are valid arguments that an attorney’s overriding duty of
candor to the court could chill a client’s willingness to confide in an
attorney; that the tensions between this duty and the lawyer’s duty to
the client are especially strong in the criminal context; and that in
the civil context, sanctions for discovery abuses presumably target
much of the same conduct. Justice Pollock nonetheless supported
the rule because he believed that “as a normative statement, it’s a
good idea to remind lawyers that they should not mislead the
173
court.”
Once again, the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the
recommendations of its appointed committee, but this time the
174
Court acted to narrow, rather than broaden, the rule. The Court
invited public comments on the Pollock Commission’s report, and
the New Jersey Bar Association recommended deleting the Rule:
[T]he very nature of the rule makes compliance difficult. As
noted in the [Pollock] Commission’s report[,] the rule strains the
attorney–client relationship by placing a duty on a lawyer to
disclose information that may be adverse to the client’s interest.
Further, how is a lawyer to know when a judge “may be misled” by
a failure to disclose? What if a judge is simply confused, does the
rule require a lawyer to bring every potentially material fact to the
court’s attention, even information forgotten or ignored by an
175
adversary? Just how far must a lawyer go?

The Court took these concerns seriously. In amending the rules, it
noted that the New Jersey State Bar Association had recommended
removing the rule “because the very nature of the rule makes
compliance difficult.” The Court went on to say that “[i]n light of the
concerns of the Bar” and the disagreements within the Pollock
Commission, it had decided to amend Rule 3.3(a)(5) “to clarify its

171

REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 169, at 12–13.
172
Justice Pollock authored a concurring opinion in 1998 on the subject of the
tension between a lawyer’s duty to his client and his duty of candor to the tribunal.
See infra notes 214–32 and accompanying text.
173
Telephone Interview with Stewart Pollock, supra note 163.
174
See supra text accompanying notes 153–54.
175
N.J. STATE BAR ASS’N, RESPONSE TO THE REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
COMMISSION ON THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND AD HOC COMMITTEE ON BAR
ADMISSIONS 11–12 (Apr. 2003) (on file with author).
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C. The Impact of Rule 3.3(a)(5)
It is unclear to what extent Rule 3.3(a)(5) matters in the
everyday lives of most New Jersey lawyers. In its twenty years of
existence, the rule has been mentioned in only about thirty-five
177
published decisions, approximately half of which simply report a
178
disciplinary order.
As of late 2002, a prominent practitioner who
defends lawyers charged with ethics violations was aware of the rule
179
but had never represented anyone charged with violating it.
Of
course, the existence of the rule since 1984 could have led New Jersey
lawyers to change their conduct in ways not reflected in the cases.
But many lawyers may not even be aware of the rule. One leading
ethics specialist who gives continuing legal education presentations
on legal ethics finds that members of his audience are often surprised
180
and concerned when they learn of the rule.
But consciousness of
the rule is likely to increase. The recent Seelig case is an extended
treatment of Rule 3.3(a)(5), and it reads like a wake-up call to the
profession on the subject of attorney candor.
For a long time after the rule’s adoption, New Jersey courts and
disciplinary bodies appeared to be reluctant to enforce Rule
3.3(a)(5). A member of New Jersey’s Disciplinary Review Board has
reportedly stated that “the Board had avoided sanctioning lawyers
based on alleged violations of . . . [Rule 3.3(a)(5)] because of

176

Supreme Court of New Jersey, Administrative Determination in Response to
the Report and Recommendation of the Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of
Professional Conduct, N.J. LAW J., Sept. 22, 2003, at 59, 65, 173 N.J.L.J. 1131, 1137.
177
This estimate includes all cases available in the LEXIS and Westlaw databases
as of September 10, 2004.
178
Disciplinary proceedings that resulted only in an admonition by the
Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) would not be reported. If the DRB recommends
any other sanction, the disciplinary order must be reviewed by the state Supreme
Court and would therefore be reported. See OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF N.J., 2003 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 14–
15 (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae/annual_report03.
pdf.
179
Telephone Interview with Albert C. Jeffers, Of Counsel, Celli & Schlossberg
(Dec. 2002). Mr. Jeffers also guessed that among plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers in
the personal injury and property damage area, “that rule may be frequently honored
in the breach.” Id.
180
Telephone Interview with Kevin H. Michels, Partner, Michels & Hockenjos
(Sept. 7, 2004). Mr. Michels is the author of the leading treatise on New Jersey
ethics, MICHELS, supra note 168.
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181

fundamental bar disagreement with the rule.”
The reported
decisions of the Board bear out this purported reluctance, but they
also suggest that the Board in recent years has become more
aggressive in its use of the rule. As of September 10, 2004, the Board
had only found a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5) in approximately twenty182
three cases, but more than half of those decisions were rendered in
183
Moreover, the earlier cases finding a violation of
2000 or later.
Rule 3.3(a)(5) usually found violations of other rules as well,
suggesting that the conduct was sanctionable under a more
184
traditional ethics regime.
In the past several years, however, the
185
Board has several times relied exclusively on Rule 3.3 and even, in
186
three decisions reported in 2002, purely on Rule 3.3(a)(5).
A state ethics advisory opinion from 1990 provides further
evidence of New Jersey’s initial reluctance to strictly enforce Rule
187
The opinion addressed whether an attorney was
3.3(a)(5).
obligated to disclose that his mentally ill patient had been
hospitalized when the terms of the patient’s right of visitation with his
daughter depended on his medical condition.
The Advisory
181

Levin, supra note 161, at 149 n.303. The article did not clearly attribute the
quote or provide a specific context for it.
182
The number may be slightly higher because sometimes the New Jersey
Supreme Court only mentions a violation of “RPC 3.3(a)” without specifying the
relevant subsection. See, e.g., In re Vella, 180 N.J. 170, 170, 850 A.2d 439, 439 (2004);
In re Uchendu, 177 N.J. 509, 509, 830 A.2d 501, 501 (2003); In re Girdler, 171 N.J.
146, 146, 792 A.2d 1243, 1243 (2002).
183
Whenever the Board decides that a lawyer should be disciplined, the case goes
to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. See 2003 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 178, at 14–15. Usually, the Supreme Court affirms the
Board’s decision in a brief published order that states only the name of the lawyer,
the rules the lawyer has violated, and the sanctions imposed. See, e.g., In re Malat, 175
N.J. 554, 817 A.2d 316 (2003); In re Santiago, 175 N.J. 499, 816 A.2d 152 (2003).
Occasionally, the Supreme Court publishes a full opinion. See, e.g., In re Norton, 128
N.J. 520, 608 A.2d 328 (1992); In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472, 569 A.2d 252 (1990).
184
For example, In re Telson, 138 N.J. 47, 648 A.2d 703 (1994), which happens to
include a one-sentence description of the offense, involved a lawyer who was found
to have altered a court document and later lied about the alteration. Id. at 47, 648
A.2d at 703. Rule 3.3(a)(5) is not needed to punish this sort of outright fraud.
185
See Malat, 175 N.J. at 554, 817 A.2d at 316; Santiago, 175 N.J. at 499, 816 A.2d at
152. These cases also cite Rule 8.4, but Rule 8.4 should not be treated as a separate
rule because unlike Rule 3.3, it is a vague catch-all that does not set forth specific
norms of conduct.
186
In re George, 174 N.J. 537, 810 A.2d 60 (2002); In re Witman, 174 N.J. 338, 805
A.2d 455 (2002); In re McGivney, 171 N.J. 34, 791 A.2d 215 (2002). Two of these
cases also cite Rule 8.4, but again, it should not be treated as a separate rule.
187
N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 643 (1990), N.J. LAW J., May 24,
1990, at 2, 24, 125 N.J.L.J. 1358, 1380.
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Committee on Professional Ethics noted that requiring disclosure in
188
these circumstances “would have especially harsh consequences.”
The Committee recommended that a lawyer balance the client’s
interests rather than literally observe Rule 3.3(a)(5), and stated that
“[a] decision that a fact is really material, or that a tribunal will
actually be misled in the absence of disclosure, is not to be made
lightly or easily, especially where, as here, there are serious negative
implications of disclosure, chilling essential communications to an
189
attorney.”
D. Cases Involving Rule 3.3(a)(5)
In most of the opinions that have implicated Rule 3.3(a)(5),
New Jersey courts did not appear, as a practical matter, to be
demanding a greater level of candor than courts in other
190
jurisdictions.
Courts in other jurisdictions, both before and after
the Model Rules were adopted, have disciplined or criticized lawyers
for blatantly misleading omissions in addition to fraudulent
commissions. Until very recently, Rule 3.3(a)(5) appeared to have
been used almost exclusively to censure attorneys for failing to
disclose information in circumstances which, under the conventional
rules, would constitute a misrepresentation anyway. However, with
Seelig and a few other recent cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court
appears to be willing to criticize or punish lawyers for conduct that
might very well have been permissible in other jurisdictions.
188

Id. at 24, 125 N.J.L.J. at 1380.
Id.
190
The set of relevant cases includes the following: (a) six disciplinary cases in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court published an opinion based in part on Rule
3.3(a)(5); b) two solely-authored concurring opinions of the New Jersey Supreme
Court that used Rule 3.3(a)(5) to emphasize the importance of candor, see
Kosmowski v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 175 N.J. 568, 576–77, 818 A.2d 319, 324 (2003)
(LaVecchia, J., concurring) and Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal
Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 463–64, 713 A.2d 411, 424–25 (1998) (Pollock, J., concurring);
(c) a case, later almost completely adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
which the intermediate appellate court used Rule 3.3(a)(5) to support a novel
discovery requirement, McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 330 N.J. Super. 568, 586–
88, 750 A.2d 189, 199 (App. Div. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 167 N.J. 359, 771 A.2d
1153 (2001); and (d) five cases in the federal district court in New Jersey and New
Jersey’s intermediate appellate court that referred to Rule 3.3(a)(5). Excluded from
this set of relevant cases are most of the Supreme Court decisions that only
summarily affirm the Disciplinary Review Board, opinions in which the
misrepresentation in question concerned an application for bar admission or an
attorney’s qualifications to practice before a court, and opinions in which the
reference to Rule 3.3(a)(5) is cursory.
189
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The most relevant category of cases in this context is disciplinary
proceedings involving a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5). New Jersey
courts have twice used Rule 3.3(a)(5) to sanction lawyers for failing
191
to disclose the death of a client. Courts in other jurisdictions have
criticized similar conduct, even though those courts could not cite a
192
local equivalent of New Jersey Rule 3.3(a)(5). In fact, in 1995, the
ABA issued an advisory opinion stating that when a client dies in the
middle of settlement negotiations, the attorney has a duty to disclose
that fact both to the court and to opposing counsel in the first
193
The ABA opinion relied on one of the
communication to either.
non-New Jersey cases as persuasive authority for its conclusion that
the failure to disclose the death of a client to the court is equivalent
to an affirmative misrepresentation within the meanings of Rule
194
3.3(a)(1) and Rule 4.1(a) of the Model Rules.
The opinion
reasoned that since the death of a client means that the lawyer either
no longer has a client, or has a different client as a result of the
client’s death, a failure to disclose the death “is tantamount to
195
making a false statement of material fact.” The committee found it
significant that the comments to Rules 3.3 and 4.1 state that under
some circumstances, the failure to disclose a fact is the equivalent of
196
an affirmative misrepresentation.
In two other cases, New Jersey attorneys were disciplined for
failing to report that property which the attorney had previously
191

In re Vella, 180 N.J. 170, 850 A.2d 439 (2003); In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428, 434–
35, 730 A.2d 340, 343–44 (1999). Vella contains only an order, not an opinion, but
the decision clearly arises out of Ms. Vella’s failure to inform the court and the
opposing party of her client’s death in the case of Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J.
Super. 144, 153–54, 797 A.2d 206, 212 (App. Div. 2002). At the end of the Kingsdorf
opinion, the court noted, along with a citation to Forrest, that it was referring the
opinion to the Office of Attorney Ethics for possible proceedings against Ms. Vella.
Id. at 160 n.3, 797 A.2d at 215 n.3.
192
See, e.g., Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507,
511–12 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Fell, 364 N.E.2d 872, 873–74 (Ohio
1977).
193
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397
(Sept. 18, 1995), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: ETHICS OPINIONS 1991–1995, at 1001:313 (1996).
194
Id. at 1001:315 (citing Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 512).
195
Id.
196
Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3 cmt. (1983) (“There
are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an
affirmative misrepresentation.”) and MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 4.1
cmt. (2002) (“Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.”)). See also supra
note 136 and accompanying text.
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represented as belonging to one person had since been transferred
to another person. In one of these cases, an attorney was disciplined
for not revealing—at his own divorce proceeding—that he had
transferred to his mother a piece of real property that he had listed as
197
an asset in papers previously submitted to the court.
The other
198
New Jersey case was actually decided before the adoption of Rule
3.3(a)(5), but was later cited in support of the adoption of that
199
rule. In this case, an attorney was disciplined under the disciplinary
rules when he failed to disclose that he had transferred property that
200
was the subject of a settlement.
Other jurisdictions have imposed sanctions for comparable
conduct. In a 1985 Arizona case, a lawyer was disciplined under
Arizona’s version of the old Model Code of Professional
Responsibility for making misleading statements and presenting
misleading testimony regarding the existence of one of his client’s
201
assets in the client’s divorce proceeding. Similarly, in 1975, a lawyer
representing the executor of an estate was disciplined under
California’s statutes on professional conduct for failing to disclose
that the devisee of the estate had written a letter waiving, in favor of
the decedent’s disinherited daughter, the devisee’s interest in the
estate. At the time, the lawyer was both prosecuting an action to
challenge the daughter’s joint ownership of the major asset in the
estate, and also defending against a will contest launched by the
202
daughter.
The letter effectively rendered both proceedings
unnecessary.
One possible reason why the New Jersey disciplinary cases
discussed above seem similar to cases in other jurisdictions is that the
omissions in the New Jersey cases violate the established principle
that an attorney should notify the court when a representation
previously made to the court is no longer correct. In fact, the 2002—
but not the 1983—ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct specify
that a lawyer has a duty to “correct a false statement of material fact
197

In re Kernan, 118 N.J. 361, 362–63, 571 A.2d 1282, 1282–83 (1990).
In re Nigohosian, 88 N.J. 308, 442 A.2d 1007 (1980).
199
See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (1984).
200
Nigohosian, 88 N.J. at 309–12, 442 A.2d at 1007–09. The specific provisions
cited were DR 1-102(A)(4), (5). Id. at 314, 442 A.2d at 1010.
201
In re Ireland, 706 P.2d 352, 354 (Ariz. 1985). The disciplinary rule cited was
Arizona Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102; the court was not specific as to
which provisions had been violated. See id.
202
Sullins v. State Bar of Cal., 542 P.2d 631, 632–35 (Cal. 1975).
198
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or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer” as well as a duty
to “take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary,
disclosure to the tribunal” when a lawyer has offered material
203
evidence and later comes to know of its falsity.
In the four New
Jersey decisions discussed above, an explicit or implicit
representation that the lawyer had made—the existence of a client or
the existence of a piece of property in a certain party’s hands—was
now false.
The other New Jersey Supreme Court opinions finding a
violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5) would also likely have come out the same
way in a different jurisdiction. In one case, a New Jersey attorney was
found to have violated Rule 3.3(a)(5) when he failed to disclose that
204
he had borrowed over $30,000 of a client’s trust funds.
This
behavior was such a fundamental ethical violation that the failure to
disclose it is almost beside the point. In two other cases, New Jersey
prosecutors were disciplined for failing to disclose to the court that a
police officer had corrupt motives for not testifying against a
205
defendant.
New Jersey is not alone in punishing this sort of
collusive behavior. An Arizona court found a violation of the local
version of Model Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) when a lawyer
failed to disclose that he had reached a collusive agreement with
206
defense counsel to dismiss the action against one of the defendants.
Finally, courts in New Jersey have occasionally used Rule
3.3(a)(5) in cases other than disciplinary proceedings to criticize
attorneys or to support a holding. For example, the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court suggested that an attorney
had violated the duty of candor when, in suing for unpaid fees, the
lawyer did not reveal that there had already been an arbitration
207
concerning those fees.
This case, along with a pre-Model Rules
disciplinary opinion that also involved a failure to disclose a
208
settlement, is analogous to a case in Arizona in which the court
203

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1), (2) (2002).
In re Gifis, 156 N.J. 323, 347, 361, 717 A.2d 406, 419, 427 (1998).
205
In re Norton, 128 N.J. 520, 522–39, 608 A.2d 328, 329–38 (1992) (disciplining
the defense attorney as well as the prosecutor); In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472, 472–78,
569 A.2d 252, 253–56 (1990).
206
In re Alcorn, 41 P.3d 600, 602–05, 614 (Ariz. 2002).
207
Horowitz v. Weishoff, 318 N.J. Super. 196, 203–04, 723 A.2d 121, 125 (App.
Div. 1999). The court cited only R. 3.3 of the New Jersey Rules. The court did not
specify which provision the attorney had violated, but the only applicable provision is
R. 3.3(a)(5).
208
In re Stein, 97 N.J. 550, 551–52, 560–62, 483 A.2d 109, 109–10, 114–15 (1984)
204
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used Arizona’s version of Model Rule 3.3(a) to sanction a lawyer who
209
had failed to disclose a settlement agreement to a settlement judge.
Likewise, in a 1997 West Virginia case, an attorney who failed to
disclose at trial that two defendants had reached a settlement
210
agreement was found to have violated “the general duty of candor.”
The New Jersey cases discussed so far are mostly conservative in
two ways. First, they do not mark a sharp departure from earlier case
law. As already discussed, it is likely that if they had arisen in another
jurisdiction, they would have come out the same way. In addition,
almost all of these cases concern a failure to disclose facts relating to
211
the management of the case, not facts actually at issue in the case.
When it first adopted Rule 3.3(a)(5), the New Jersey Supreme Court
had stated that the provision applies to “facts that are at issue in the
212
case as well as facts relating to the management of the case.” And
yet almost none of these cases deal with a lawyer who fails to disclose
213
a fact relating to the substance of a dispute. The death of a client,
the existence of a prior arbitration or settlement, and the reasons for
a police officer’s failure to testify all go not to the truth for which a
trial is supposed to be a search, but to the parameters within which
that search occurs. It is as if the New Jersey courts insisted on
knowing who the players are and why they are fighting, but did not
want to intervene in the game itself. Like a boxing referee, the courts
stepped in only when absolutely necessary.
E. A New Direction, Possibly
Four recent opinions from the New Jersey Supreme Court
concerning Rule 3.3(a)(5) and the duty of candor are much bolder
and are unique enough that they might have been decided
(disciplining lawyer for not disclosing the existence of a civil settlement that probably
influenced a victim’s decision to withdraw a criminal charge in the same matter).
The respondent was charged with violating DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6). Id. at 562,
483 A.2d at 115.
209
In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 976–78 (Ariz. 1995).
210
Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 400 (W. Va. 1997).
211
An exception is In re Kernan, 118 N.J. 361, 571 A.2d 1282 (1990), in which the
lawyer did not tell the court that he had transferred an asset to his mother during his
own divorce proceeding. Id. at 362–63, 571 A.2d at 1282–83. As discussed above, this
case was also based on the familiar principle that a lawyer has a duty to correct a
representation that later turns out to be incorrect. See supra text accompanying notes
197, 203. The Court was probably also concerned that the conduct resembled a
fraudulent conveyance.
212
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2002).
213
For this observation I am indebted to MICHELS, supra note 168, at 633.
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differently in another jurisdiction. Two of the opinions recognize a
duty to make the court and opposing counsel aware of material facts
at issue in the case. In different ways, each opinion seems to aspire to
a regime of the type Frankel envisioned. This quartet of opinions
may augur the beginning of an era in which the standard of attorney
candor in New Jersey is noticeably higher than in other jurisdictions.
The first of these opinions was a concurring opinion authored in
214
1998 by Justice Pollock.
Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban
215
Renewal Associates was a slip-and-fall case in which the lawyers for the
owner of property concealed their client’s bankruptcy status as part
of the “trial strategy.” Because the plaintiff did not know that the
owner of the property was in bankruptcy, she wasted time and
resources proceeding against the owner instead of the bankruptcy
trustee. The owner was not in control of the property and the
defense lawyers knew the owner would therefore not be found
216
liable. The answer included as a defense that “the alleged damages
were caused by other persons over whom this defendant had no
control,” and, in response to interrogatories about the owner of the
building, the defense lawyers stated that it was in the care of a “Court
217
appointed Manager.”
The plaintiff’s lawyer not only failed to use
this hint, but also waited until nine days before trial to take the
deposition, at which the lawyer finally learned of the bankruptcy
status. At that point, the lawyer believed (wrongly) that it was too late
218
to name the trustee in bankruptcy as a defendant.
Justice Pollock used the occasion to comment on “the
219
obligations of lawyers to each other and to the judicial system.” The
justice was dismayed at the costs to the plaintiff, the courts, and the
public that could have been saved had the defense lawyers simply
disclosed their client’s bankruptcy status in their answer to the
220
complaint. Justice Pollock concluded that various rules and codes
of conduct, among them Rule 3.3(a)(5), “require what common
courtesy and candor suggest, that pleadings and answers to
214

After retiring from the Court, Justice Pollock chaired the Commission that
recommended keeping Rule 3.3(a)(5) at the same time that it signaled to the Court
that the rule creates tensions. See supra text accompanying notes 169–71.
215
154 N.J. 437, 713 A.2d 411 (1998).
216
See id. at 459–63, 713 A.2d at 422–24 (Pollock, J., concurring).
217
Id. at 443–44, 713 A.2d at 414.
218
Id. at 456, 713 A.2d at 420.
219
Id. at 463, 713 A.2d at 424 (Pollock, J., concurring).
220
See id. at 462, 713 A.2d at 424 (Pollock, J., concurring).
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interrogatories should not contain half-truths intended to mislead
221
both adversaries and the court.” Justice Pollock drew support from
222
two out-of-state cases and went on to state that “[s]henanigans have
no place in a law suit. Modern litigation is too time consuming and
expensive for courts to tolerate discovery abuses. For over fifty years,
courts have endeavored to transform civil litigation from a battle
223
royal into a search for truth.”
This opinion is striking. For one thing, it uses strong language
to criticize conduct that, under prevailing standards of ethics, is far
from an obvious violation. Second, the opinion calls on lawyers to
disclose adverse facts at issue in a case. The defense lawyers in Kernan
did not go out of their way to help the plaintiff’s lawyer, but they
probably believed that it was not their duty to do so. The Court’s
opinion did not even discuss the issue of candor, apart from stating
in a single sentence that defense counsel “should have informed
plaintiff that [the defendant] was in bankruptcy and that a trustee
224
had been appointed.”
If the defense lawyers’ lack of candor was
such an obvious violation, the Court should have had more to say.
225
But only one other justice signed on to Justice Pollock’s opinion.
Furthermore, one of the two out-of-state cases that Justice Pollock
quoted specifically stated that the disclosure at issue in that case
might not have been required by any “canon of ethics or legal
226
obligation.”
The other out-of-state case concerned the failure to
221

Kernan, 154 N.J. at 464–65, 713 A.2d at 425 (Pollock, J., concurring).
Id. 465–66, 713 A.2d at 425–26 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Spaulding v.
Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (setting aside settlement of a personal
injury action because defense counsel did not disclose that defense’s doctor had
discovered an internal injury arising out of the accident that plaintiff did not know
about) and Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507
(E.D. Mich. 1983)). Compare Spaulding with Southern Trenching, Inc. v. Diago, 600
So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a jury verdict in a personal injury
action because the plaintiff “deliberately concealed” the fact that he had also been
injured in a later, unrelated accident and “thus falsely misled the court and jury that
his damages could have been caused only by the defendant’s negligence”). The
Southern Trenching court was particularly offended that the trial judge, in denying the
defendant’s post-trial motion, “actually saw fit to praise the plaintiff’s
disingenuousness.” 600 So. 2d at 1167 n.3. The trial judge had written, “Plaintiff did
not tell either expert of the [later] accident because, in his own words, ‘They never
asked me! I was told not to volunteer.’ Would that all witnesses would be so direct!” Id.
223
Kernan, 154 N.J. at 467, 713 A.2d at 426 (Pollock, J., concurring).
224
Id. at 462, 713 A.2d at 424 (Pollock, J., concurring).
225
See id. at 467, 713 A.2d at 427 (Justice Coleman joining the concurring opinion
of Justice Pollock).
226
Id. at 465, 713 A.2d at 425 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Spaulding, 116
222
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228

disclose the death of a client, which, as discussed above, is widely
regarded as a serious violation. Finally, Justice Pollock’s opinion
acknowledged that “[m]ore egregious examples of discovery abuse
229
may exist.”
All of these circumstances suggest that Justice Pollock—who
after retiring from the bench argued for the retention of Rule
3.3(a)(5) because he believed that it serves as a useful normative
230
reminder —was deliberately using the case to send a message about
231
the importance of candor. In light of current ethical standards, the
strength of his admonition appears to be out of proportion to the
obfuscation that prompted it. It was not clear whether Justice Pollock
was trying to work towards curbing extreme abuses or, more
dramatically, changing the level of candor generally considered
acceptable in New Jersey. In any case, the opinion has been cited in
each of the other three recent Supreme Court opinions admonishing
232
lawyers about the importance of candor.
Another concurring opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court
was notable because it specifically discussed Rule 3.3(a)(5), even
though the statements at issue were flatly false and therefore a
violation of the more conventional rules. Kosmowski v. Atlantic City
233
Medical Center involved an attorney who attempted to postpone a
trial by stating that his expert witness, a neurosurgeon, was
unavailable. The plaintiffs’ lawyer declared, “The problem is, Judge,
I found out on Friday that Dr. Doyle, the plaintiffs’ expert, is in
234
Europe. And is not going to be available for two weeks.” It was true
N.W.2d 704).
227
Id. at 465, 713 A.2d at 425–26 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Virzi, 571 F.
Supp. 507).
228
See supra text accompanying notes 191–96.
229
Kernan, 154 N.J. at 467, 713 A.2d at 426 (Pollock, J., concurring).
230
See supra text accompanying note 173.
231
Justice Pollock later said, in a speech based on his Kernan opinion published in
the New Jersey Law Journal, that “[w]hat caught my eye [in the case] was the tension
between the duty of the defense lawyer to his client, on the one hand, and, on the
other, to the plaintiff and the court.” He also said that the Kernan case “started me
thinking” about that tension. Stewart Pollock, Duty to Client vs. Duty to Court: The
Rules of Professionalism Direct Lawyers to Conduct Themselves with Dignity and Fairness, N.J.
LAW J., Oct. 12, 1998, at 23, 154 N.J.L.J. 115.
232
In re Seelig, 180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004); Kosmowski v. Atlantic City Med.
Ctr., 175 N.J. 568, 818 A.2d 319 (2003); McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 167 N.J.
359, 771 A.2d 1153 (2001).
233
175 N.J. 568, 818 A.2d 319 (2003).
234
Id. at 573, 818 A.2d at 322.
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that on Friday Dr. Doyle’s wife told the lawyer that Dr. Doyle was in
Europe. However, that very morning the attorney had spoken with
Dr. Doyle by telephone and learned that he had returned from
Europe, though would not be available to testify until the latter
235
portion of the next week.
The trial judge, unaware of the reality,
236
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
The Supreme Court’s
opinion addressed whether the dismissal was proper in light of the
237
attorney’s lack of candor.
Justice LaVecchia wrote a brief concurrence. The justice’s main
point was that “[a]s adopted in New Jersey, Rule of Professional
Conduct (RPC) 3.3 imposes on attorneys a ‘stringent’ burden of
disclosure,” a burden that—and here Justice LaVecchia quoted
Justice Pollock’s Kernan opinion—is greater than the one imposed by
238
the ABA version. The opinion dealt mostly with Rule 3.3(a)(5) and
implied that the plaintiffs’ lawyer could have been sanctioned under
239
the ethics rules.
However, Justice LaVecchia did not need to use Rule 3.3(a)(5)
to make her point. The plaintiffs’ lawyer made a false statement of
material fact and therefore clearly violated, in New Jersey or any
other jurisdiction, Rule 3.3(a)(1) or an equivalent. The lawyer had
stated, “I found out on Friday that Dr. Doyle, the plaintiffs’ expert, is
240
in Europe.”
Since Dr. Doyle’s lawyer knew that Dr. Doyle was no
241
longer in Europe, the statement was false.
The fact that Justice
LaVecchia was willing to rest criticism of an attorney’s conduct on a
rule not even necessary for that criticism suggests an increasing
awareness of the rule and a willingness to interpret it more broadly.
Another New Jersey Supreme Court opinion enunciated a novel
242
rule regarding the duty to disclose during discovery.
The holding
243
was supported in part using Rule 3.3(a)(5). McKenney v. Jersey City
235

Id. at 572, 818 A.2d at 321–22.
Id. at 573, 818 A.2d at 322.
237
See id. at 570, 573, 818 A.2d at 320, 322.
238
Id. at 576–77, 818 A.2d at 324 (LaVecchia, J., concurring).
239
Kosmowski, 175 N.J. at 576–78, 818 A.2d at 324–25 (LaVecchia, J., concurring).
240
Id. at 573, 818 A.2d at 322 (emphasis added).
241
It would have been technically accurate, though highly misleading, if the
lawyer had said, “On Friday I was told Dr. Doyle is in Europe. And he is not going to
be available until the end of next week.”
242
McKenney v. Jersey City Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 359, 771 A.2d 1153 (2001)
[hereinafter McKenney II], rev’g 330 N.J. Super. 568, 750 A.2d 189 (App. Div. 2000)
[hereinafter McKenney I].
243
The Supreme Court opinion does not directly mention Rule 3.3(a)(5), but the
236
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Medical Center involved witnesses whose testimony at trial was
244
inconsistent with their deposition testimony. The plaintiff’s counsel
was caught off-guard, and the Supreme Court found that “defense
counsel had a continuing obligation to disclose to the trial court and
counsel for plaintiffs any anticipated material changes in a
245
defendant’s or a material witness’s deposition testimony.”
The
Court acknowledged that New Jersey’s rules of civil procedure do not
specify any such duty. Nonetheless, the Court held that such a duty
246
follows inevitably from the rules’ purpose of eliminating surprise.
The Appellate Division had written, in language adopted by the
Supreme Court, “We thus take this opportunity to make explicit what
247
is plainly implicit in our discovery practice.”
The oxymoronic “plainly implicit” is a clue that neither court
wanted to acknowledge how dramatic a departure this holding
actually was from mainstream discovery requirements. In federal
practice, for example, there is an ongoing duty to supplement or
correct prior disclosures with respect to every discovery device but
248
depositions. In McKenney, the Appellate Division was distorting the
federal rule when it wrote, in language quoted by the Supreme
Court, “Although the Advisory Committee’s notes indicate that the
provision establishing a continuing duty to disclose does not apply to
deposition testimony, the express language of the Rule is not so
249
250
limited.”
In fact, the language of the federal rule is so limited.
The point of the Advisory Committee note is to indicate that the
wording of the new rule, which expressly mentions every discovery
device except for the deposition, was intended to exclude deposition
Appellate Division opinion stated, albeit in a footnote, that the Rules of Professional
Conduct, including Rule 3.3(a)(5), support its position, McKenney I, 330 N.J. Super.
at 588 n.1, 750 A.2d at 199 n.1, and the Supreme Court adopted the Appellate
Division’s opinion. The Supreme Court stated, “We agree with the Appellate
Division’s . . . legal analysis concerning a lawyer’s duty of disclosure in such
circumstances,” and then quoted the entire relevant section of the Appellate Division
opinion, except for the footnotes. McKenney II, 167 N.J. at 370–71, 771 A.2d at 1159–
60.
244
McKenney II, 167 N.J. at 366–67, 771 A.2d at 1157.
245
Id. at 371, 771 A.2d at 1160.
246
Id. at 370, 373, 771 A.2d at 1159, 1161.
247
Id. at 370, 771 A.2d at 1159 (quoting McKenney I, 330 N.J. Super. at 588, 750
A.2d at 200).
248
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2).
249
McKenney II, 167 N.J. at 371, 771 A.2d at 1160 (quoting McKenney I, 330 N.J.
Super. at 589, 750 A.2d at 200).
250
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2).
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testimony.
With McKenney, the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to be
trying to make lawyers cooperate in the search for truth. McKenney
effectively makes a lawyer responsible for ensuring that the adversary
and the court are fully apprised of the substantive facts at issue in a
case. In that respect, McKenney—which was authored by Justice
Coleman (the only justice to join Justice Pollock’s Kernan opinion)—
252
resembles Justice Pollock’s opinion in Kernan, which McKenney cites.
Both opinions arguably contemplate a modification of the adversary
system in the direction that Frankel envisioned.
The final New Jersey Supreme Court opinion implicating the
253
duty of candor is In re Seelig. This recent decision, handed down in
June of 2004, is probably the most remarkable one of the set. In
1998, Jack Seelig was representing Jeffrey Poje, who had caused a
deadly automobile accident. Poje was arrested, and the county
prosecutor charged him with manslaughter and death by automobile.
Later, the township police department issued summonses to Poje for
motor vehicle offenses arising out of the same accident. At the
municipal court hearing on the motor vehicle offenses, Jack Seelig,
without informing the judge of the pending indictable offenses, had
Poje plead guilty to the motor vehicle offenses. The result, as Seelig
well knew, was that under New Jersey law, there was now a doublejeopardy bar to prosecuting Poje on the more serious pending
charges. The judge did not make the inquiries that he was required
to make as he accepted the plea, nor did he notify the county
prosecutor as he was supposed to, in order to give the prosecutor a
254
chance to have the municipal proceedings stayed.
Seelig was charged with a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(5) for failing
to bring the pending indictable charges to the attention of the
255
256
municipal judge. Seelig’s case divided a district ethics committee,
251

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1994) (stating that the 1993
version of the rule clarifies that the ongoing duty to supplement does not
“ordinarily” apply to deposition testimony). For the point that the Court’s
description of the federal rule is wrong, I am indebted to William S. Gyves, The Duty
to Disclose Inaccurate Deposition Testimony: Appellate Division Ruling Puts New Jersey Law at
Odds with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, N.J. LAW J., Sept. 4, 2000, at 28, 32, 161
N.J.L.J. 1048, 1052.
252
167 N.J. at 371–72, 771 A.2d at 1160–61.
253
180 N.J. 234, 850 A.2d 477 (2004).
254
Id. at 237–41, 850 A.2d at 479–81.
255
Id. at 237, 850 A.2d at 479.
256
In 2001 the Committee voted 2–1 to dismiss the ethics complaint. The
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257

as well as the Disciplinary Review Board, but the Supreme Court was
unanimous. Writing for the Court, the chief justice recounted the
258
history of Rule 3.3(a)(5) and reflected on “the double character of
259
The Court made the remarkable
an attorney’s duty.”
pronouncement that Rule 3.3(a)(5) “is a paradigm for [a] shift” from
260
“the client’s interest to the legal system and the public interest.”
And, after reviewing the key Rule 3.3(a)(5) disciplinary cases, as well
as Justice Pollock’s Kernan opinion, the Court cited, for the first time,
the proposal that Marvin Frankel published in 1975—the Rule’s likely
261
indirect ancestor.
Indeed, the Court’s analysis of Seelig’s conduct probably would
have pleased Frankel. The Supreme Court acknowledged that in
Poje’s case, the system had broken down in that the judge and
prosecutors had failed to fulfill their responsibilities. However, the
262
Court insisted that Seelig had a duty to correct this breakdown.
The ethics rules “compel a lawyer to act affirmatively against his or
her client’s interests even when the primary responsibility for
263
informing the court does not (or may not) lie with the lawyer.” The
Court refrained from punishing Seelig because the issue was novel,
264
and he had acted in good faith.
Justice LaVecchia (the author of
the Kosmowski concurrence) wrote separately to argue that Seelig
265
should have been disciplined.
Seelig gives teeth to Rule 3.3(a)(5). The outcome would likely
not have been the same in a jurisdiction with a traditional duty of
candor rule. A 1994 advisory opinion of the Texas Bar’s ethics
committee found that at sentencing, a defense lawyer who knows that
the defendant has prior convictions may remain silent when the
judge incorrectly states that the defendant has no prior conviction,
dissenter was the lone non-lawyer on the three-member panel. Mary P. Gallagher,
Ethics Panel Clears Lawyer Charged with Lack of Candor to Tribunal, N.J. LAW J., Aug. 20,
2001, at 4, 165 N.J.L.J. 704.
257
In June 2002 the Board decided by a vote of 4–3 that Seelig had violated Rule
3.3(a)(5), but five votes would have been required to actually discipline Seelig. 180
N.J. at 241–45, 850 A.2d at 482–84.
258
Id. at 245–49, 850 A.2d at 484–86.
259
Id. at 248, 850 A.2d at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
260
Id. at 249, 850 A.2d at 487.
261
Id. at 250, 850 A.2d at 487.
262
Id. at 252–53, 850 A.2d at 488–89.
263
Seelig, 180 N.J. at 253, 850 A.2d at 489.
264
Id. at 256–58, 850 A.2d at 491–92.
265
Id. at 258–59, 850 A.2d at 492 (LaVecchia, J., concurring and dissenting).
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even when the judge asks the district attorney, “Right?” According
to that opinion, it is not the defense lawyer’s duty to make the court
aware of every piece of information that could increase the
defendant’s punishment. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Seelig
essentially found otherwise. The Court in Seelig would probably have
been even less likely to agree with a 1991 Maryland court that held
that a lawyer did not violate ethical rules when he failed to disclose to
police and at the arraignment that his client was operating under a
267
false identity.
These recent opinions appear to signal a desire on the part of
the New Jersey Supreme Court to modify the adversary ethos. It is
true that the Supreme Court recently acted to weaken Rule 3.3(a)(5),
but these changes may have simply been an attempt to make the rule
more acceptable to the profession so as to encourage compliance
268
with it. (The Supreme Court nearly stated as much. ) All of the
cases discussed in this Article were decided under the old rule, but as
it turns out, none of them, not even the more adventurous ones, are
likely to have come out differently under the new rule. None of these
cases deals with a situation in which the attorney’s conduct might
have “tend[ed]” to mislead the tribunal but was not “reasonably
certain” to have done so. And none of these cases deals with the
potential situation that has so troubled some of the critics of Frankel,
the early Kutak Commission drafts, and Rule 3.3(a)(5); namely, one
in which the attorney might have to disclose privileged information.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s changes to Rule 3.3(a)(5) make the
rule a more credible instrument of enforcement, but they do not
remove its potential to modify the way adversarial business is
conducted in New Jersey’s legal system.
CONCLUSION
The experience of New Jersey suggests that simply enacting
ethics rules of the type Frankel envisioned is unlikely to make trials
266

State Bar of Tex. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 504, 58 TEX. B.J. 718, 718–19
(1995).
267
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488 (Md. 1991). But see In
re Seig, 515 N.W.2d 694 (Wis. 1994) (holding that lawyer violated local ethics rules in
not disclosing that a client was using the client’s brother’s name in connection with
traffic offenses); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Heffernan, 569 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio
1991) (holding that lawyer violated Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7102(B)(1) for failing to disclose that his client had falsely assumed the identity of his
brother for purposes of his brother’s traffic offense).
268
See supra text accompanying note 176.
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more truthful without a broader commitment to candor on the part
of the legal profession. The evidence strongly suggests that Rule
3.3(a)(5) notwithstanding, New Jersey courts have not been
comfortable enforcing, and New Jersey lawyers are not comfortable
observing, a broader duty of candor than exists in other jurisdictions.
In New Jersey, as in other jurisdictions, a lawyer is not responsible for
helping the tribunal arrive at the truth.
The question is whether, over an extended period of time, a
series of cases like McKenney and Seelig could gradually induce lawyers
to be more committed to the truth. The bar’s hostile reaction to the
early Kutak Commission drafts, as well as the reception of Rule
3.3(a)(5), are reminders that American lawyers have a deep-seated
view of themselves as partisan gladiators. That conception of the
lawyer’s role does not leave much room for a duty to make the
tribunal aware of information that could damage a client’s cause.
New Jersey’s experience with Rule 3.3(a)(5) can help us to
evaluate some of the major arguments made against Frankel’s
269
proposal over the years.
The experience of New Jersey does not
bear on the arguments that in an adversary system some values take
precedence over truth, and that the ultimate end of truth-seeking
sometimes requires the deliberate subversion of truth. Those are
larger philosophical issues. Likewise, New Jersey’s experience does
not help to evaluate the argument that Frankel’s proposals would
weaken the attorney–client relationship and discourage effective
representation because New Jersey has not systematically enforced
270
Rule 3.3(a)(5).
New Jersey’s experience with Rule 3.3(a)(5) does, however,
support the prediction that simply writing stricter ethics rules is
271
unlikely to change adversarial conduct. Pizzi and Saltzburg argued
that the nature of an adversary system puts pressure on ethics rules.
A lawyer whose job is to win for the client will always test the
boundaries of permissible conduct, shading facts to present them in
the light most favorable to the client. Until recently, lawyers,
disciplinary bodies, and judges seemed to have a common
understanding that lawyers simply cannot, consistent with their role,
observe the letter of the old Rule 3.3(a)(5). The New Jersey Supreme
Court tacitly acknowledged this point when it narrowed Rule
269
270
271

See supra Part I.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 68–70.
See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
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3.3(a)(5), and recognized the bar’s complaint that “the very nature
of [Rule 3.3(a)(5)] makes compliance difficult.”
The new rule, however, if treated literally, would continue the
old rule’s dramatic departure from the traditional adversary system.
The new rule exempts privileged communications from disclosure.
This prevents lawyers from having to disclose client confidences and
therefore relieves the most extreme tension created by the rule. But
most material facts, or facts without which the tribunal could be
misled, are not privileged. Anything the lawyer learns from anyone
other than the client is not privileged, and even if the lawyer learns
the information from the client, the information is not privileged
unless confidential. For example, the facts withheld in McKenney and
Seelig were not privileged. In fact, Frankel’s original proposal had
included an exception for privileged communications.
The other major change to the rule is from “may tend to be
misled by such failure” to “is reasonably certain to be misled by such
failure.” But the significance of that change depends—as does the
meaning of Rule 3.3(a)(5) more generally—entirely on what “misled
by such failure” means, and that is not an easy question. The word
“misleading” is well understood. “Misleading” is the standard used in
272
SEC Rule 10b-5, probably the most famous example in American
law of a standard prohibiting deception. Most people understand
that a statement is misleading if, while literally accurate, it causes the
person who hears the statement to believe something other than what
the speaker knows to be correct.
“Misled by such failure” is much more difficult. This phrase
refers to the effect of an omission on the hearer, not to the properties
of a statement. The phrase appears to presume an objectively
truthful, correct, or complete version of events. If a tribunal fails to
perceive that version, it has been misled. If the tribunal fails to
perceive that version because it was not aware of a particular fact,
then that fact must be material and the failure to disclose it violates
Rule 3.3(a)(5). Conversely, if a fact is material, then by definition, it
could affect the tribunal’s understanding of events, and that means
that without that fact, the court could be misled. The definition of
“misled” as used in Rule 3.3(a)(5) thus collapses into the definition
of materiality, or the other way around. Either way, the change from
“may tend to be misled” to “reasonably certain to be misled” seems to
deal only with the importance of the withheld fact to the issue on
272

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
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which it will shed light—in other words, with how material the fact
actually is. But if a fact is not very material, then a failure to disclose
it does not matter much. The difference between the new rule and
the old rule, then, is that the new rule does not apply to insignificant
cases.
In other words, the new version of the rule retains the key
feature of the old version, which is also the basic difficulty of this rule
and indeed with parts of Frankel’s original proposal in an adversary
system of procedure. That difficulty, reflected in one form or
another in nearly all of the criticisms of Rule 3.3(a)(5), the early
Kutak Commission drafts, and Frankel’s proposal, is that a duty of
affirmative candor requires the lawyer to think in some sense about
what result the court should reach. But a lawyer hired to help a
particular client is in a poor position to make that judgment. If New
Jersey’s Supreme Court continues its experiment, we will find out
whether lawyers are incapable or merely, for the time being,
unwilling.
APPENDIX
DEC. 16, 1974: FRANKEL’S PROPOSAL
(1) In his representation of a client, unless prevented from
doing so by a privilege reasonably believed to apply, a lawyer shall:
(a) Report to the court and opposing counsel the existence
of relevant evidence or witnesses where the lawyer does not intend to
offer such evidence or witnesses.
(b) Prevent, or when prevention has proved unsuccessful,
report to the court and opposing counsel the making of any untrue
statement by client or witness or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the
273
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
(c) Question witnesses with a purpose and design to elicit
the whole truth, including particularly supplementary and qualifying
matters that render evidence already given more accurate,
273

Cf. Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading[.]
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2004).
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intelligible, or fair than it otherwise would be.
(2) In the construction and application of the rules in
subdivision (1), a lawyer will be held to possess knowledge he actually
274
has, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have.
AUGUST 1979: INITIAL DRAFT OF THE
ABA’S MODEL RULES LEAKED TO THE PRESS
3.2: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
In presenting a cause, a lawyer shall be properly candid to the
tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not: . . . .
(2) Make a knowing misrepresentation of fact;
(3) Fail to disclose a fact, even if the fact is adverse, when:
(i) Law or the rules of professional conduct require the
lawyer to disclose the fact; or
(ii) Disclosure of the fact is necessary to correct a
misapprehension resulting from a previous representation the lawyer
has made to the court; or
(iii) Disclosure of the fact would probably have a
substantial effect on the determination of a material issue of fact,
except [in criminal defense context].
274

From Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1975). The ABA disciplinary rules he was proposing to supplement or
displace, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102, provided:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
....
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is
required by law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation of evidence when he knows or it
is obvious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows
to be illegal or fraudulent.
....
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon
his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do
so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal . . . .
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon
a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
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(4) [except in context of criminal defense], offer evidence
that the lawyer knows beyond a reasonable doubt to be false or
fabricated, or offer without suitable explanation evidence that the
lawyer knows is substantially misleading. If a lawyer discovers that
evidence or testimony that the lawyer has presented is false or
fabricated, it is the lawyer’s duty to disclose that fact and to take
suitable measures to rectify the consequences, even if doing so
requires disclosure of a confidence of the client or disclosure that the
client is implicated in the falsification or fabrication;
....
JANUARY 30, 1980: “DISCUSSION DRAFT” OF THE ABA’S MODEL RULES
RULE 3.1: CANDOR TOWARD TRIBUNAL
A lawyer shall be candid toward a tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not:
....
(2) make a knowing misrepresentation of fact;
(3) [except in context of criminal defense] offer evidence
that the lawyer is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is false, or
offer without suitable explanation evidence that the lawyer knows is
substantially misleading;
....
(b) [except in context of criminal defense] if a lawyer discovers
that evidence or testimony presented by the lawyer is false, the lawyer
shall disclose that fact and take suitable measures to rectify the
consequences, even if doing so requires disclosure of a confidence of
the client or disclosure that the client is implicated in the
falsification.
....
(d) [except in context of criminal defense] a lawyer shall
disclose a fact known to the lawyer, even if the fact is adverse, when
disclosure:
(i) is required by law or the rules of professional conduct;
or
(ii) is necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension
resulting from a previous representation the lawyer has made to the
tribunal.
....
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MAY 30, 1981: “PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT” OF THE MODEL RULES
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, or fail
to disclose a fact in circumstances where the failure to make the
disclosure is the equivalent of the lawyer’s making a material
misrepresentation;
(2) fail to make a disclosure of fact necessary to prevent a
fraud on the tribunal;
....
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
AUGUST 1983: THE MODEL RULES AS ADOPTED BY THE ABA
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by the client;
....
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
....
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 2002 VERSION
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail
to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to
the tribunal by the lawyer;
....
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(2) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has
offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. . . .
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative
proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is
engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to
the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1984-2003 VERSION
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting an illegal, criminal or
fraudulent act by the client;
....
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures; or
(5) fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge
that the tribunal may tend to be misled by such failure.
(Emphasis added to show departure from 1983 version of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.)

NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 2004 VERSION
RULE 3.3: CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
(a) a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting an illegal, criminal or
fraudulent act by the client;
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....
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures; or
(5) fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact knowing that the
omission is reasonably certain to mislead the tribunal, except that it shall not
be a breach of this rule if the disclosure is protected by a recognized privilege or
is otherwise prohibited by law.
(Emphasis added to show departure from 1984 version of the
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct.)

